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Inter-Branch Appointments After the
Independent Counsel: Court Appointment of
United States Attorneys
Ross E. Wienert
The Supreme Court's landmark opinion in Morrison v. Ol-
son, upholding the court appointment of the Independent
Counsel, sparked an intense debate that focused in part on the
propriety of courts appointing prosecutors.1 With the expira-
tion of the Independent Counsel Act in June 1999,2 many be-
lieved this controversial practice had become a historical foot-
note. This belief is unfounded, however, because the U.S. Code
empowers district courts to pick their own United States Attor-
neys (U.S. Attorneys) when there is no presidentially nomi-
nated, Senate-confirmed U.S. Attorney for more than 120
days.3 Since the Independent Counsel Act expired, the U.S. At-
torney remains the only executive-branch officer who courts
have the power to appoint. Given the increased politicization of
the appointments process, this power raises serious constitu-
tional concerns.
The Constitution endows the President of the United
States with the solemn power to deprive citizens of life, liberty,
and property through invocation of the criminal justice system.4
t Trial Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice; J.D., George Washington
University Law School, 1996. Many thanks to Professor Bradford Clark, Wil-
liam Jackson, Paul Fishman, Chip Sgro, and Shane Kadidal for providing
helpful comments on earlier drafts. The opinions expressed herein are the
personal opinions of the author. The opinions and conclusions herein do not
represent and are not intended to represent the views of the Department of
Justice.
1. 487 U.S. 654, 696-734 (1988).
2. See 28 U.S.C. § 599 (1994); see also Roberto Suro, As Special Counsel
Law Expires, Power Will Shift Back to Reno, WASH. POST, June 30, 1999, at
A6.
3. See 28 U.S.C. § 546(d) (1994).
4. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see also Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731,
750 (1982) ("[The President is] entrusted with supervisory and policy respon-
sibilities of utmost discretion and sensitivity. These include the enforcement
of federal law-it is the President who is charged constitutionally to 'take Care
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Through the Department of Justice, the President can call upon
an awesome array of investigative and prosecutorial resources
to execute the nation's laws. 5 This responsibility, and the dis-
cretion that comes with it, is exercised primarily through the
ninety-three U.S. Attorneys who supervise the career federal
prosecutors around the country.6 As impressive as the Justice
Department's resources may be, it is also an unwieldy behe-
moth of over 100,000 employees. 7 Although the Attorney Gen-
that the Laws be faithfully executed'....").
5. See generally DANIEL J. MEADOR, THE PRESIDENT, THE ATrORNEY
GENERAL, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 10-43 (1980).
6. There are ninety-four judicial districts-geographic zones within the
jurisdiction of a district court---in the United States. See U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 1-2.500 (1997) [hereinafter
U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/
foia.reading-room/usam/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2001). Each state has at least
one district and no district crosses a state line. JAMES EISENSTEIN, COUNSEL
FOR THE UNITED STATES: U.S. ATTORNEYS IN THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL
SYSTEMS 11 (1978). There are also districts for Puerto Rico, Guam, and the
Northern Mariana Islands. U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra, § 1-2.500. There
is one U.S. Attorney in each judicial district, but the U.S. Attorney for the
Northern Mariana Islands can also serve simultaneously as the U.S. Attorney
for another judicial district. See 28 U.S.C. § 545(a) (1994). Traditionally, the
U.S. Attorney for Guam also serves as the U.S. Attorney for the Northern
Mariana Islands so that, while there are ninety-four judicial districts, there
are only ninety-three U.S. Attorneys. See U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra, §
3-2.100 (explaining that there is one U.S. Attorney per judicial district "with
the exception of Guam and the Northern Marianas, where a single United
States Attorney serves in both districts").
7. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
355 (120th ed. 2000). In addition to conducting litigation on behalf of the fed-
eral government, the Department of Justice administers many ancillary law
enforcement agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Im-
migration and Naturalization Service, the Drug Enforcement Administration,
the Bureau of Prisons, and the Marshals Service. See U.S. ATTORNEYS'
MANUAL, supra note 6, §§ 1-2.300 to 1-2.306; MEADOR, supra note 5, at 18-24
(cataloging and describing the law enforcement bureaus and agencies admin-
istered by the Department of Justice). In 2000, the federal budget authorized
the Department of Justice to employ approximately 126,000 people. Justice
Mgmt. Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, 2000 Budget Summary, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/2k-summary/2ktoc.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2001).
This includes approximately 5000 career prosecutors assigned to the various
U.S. Attorneys' offices (Assistant U.S. Attorney or AUSA) and approximately
2500 attorneys assigned to the Washington, D.C. headquarters of the Depart-
ment known as "Main Justice." Id.; cf. Griffin B. Bell, The Attorney General:
The Federal Government's Chief Lawyer and Chief Litigator, or One Among
Many?, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1049, 1049 (1978) (representing that the De-
partment of Justice employed 3806 attorneys in 1978-2008 in Washington,
D.C., and 1798 in the U.S. Attorneys' offices (citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
LEGAL ACTIITIES 2 (1977))). In 1904, the Department of Justice employed
approximately 260 officers and employees in Washington, D.C. and nearly
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eral heads the Department of Justice,8 a U.S. Attorney serves
as the chief federal law enforcement official within each judicial
district.9 The U.S. Attorneys are statutorily empowered, and
with few exceptions, have been delegated the authority to make
the critical decisions that drive criminal prosecutions. 10
As the scope and scale of federal law enforcement ex-
pands,1' so too does the U.S. Attorneys' ability to affect the
daily life of every American citizen. The exercise of this awe-
some power can have dire consequences for the citizens within
a particular U.S. Attorney's district.12 For example, U.S. At-
torneys routinely decide whether to focus limited investigative
1300 "field officers and employees" in the various U.S. Attorneys' offices.
JAMES S. EASBY-SMITH, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; ITS HISTORY AND
FUNCTIONS 25 (1904).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 503 (1994) ("The Attorney General is the head of the De-
partment of Justice."); id. § 519 (authorizing the Attorney General to super-
vise the work of the U.S. Attorneys).
9. Nadler v. Mann, 951 F.2d 301, 305 (11th Cir. 1992) ("A United States
Attorney, appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, is the chief
federal law enforcement official for the judicial district he serves and is re-
sponsible for the prosecution of all offenses against the United States within
his district."); see 28 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1994).
10. See 28 U.S.C. § 547 (1994) (establishing duties of U.S. Attorneys and
vesting U.S. Attorneys with authority to "prosecute for all offenses against the
United States").
11. For a discussion of the expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction, see
Charles D. Bonner, The Federalization of Crime: Too Much of a Good Thing?,
32 U. RICH. L. REV. 905, 920-25 (1998). The dramatic proliferation in federal
crimes is largely a product of the Twentieth Century. See HOMER CUMMINGS
& CARL MCFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF
JUSTICE AND THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE 474-75 (1937) (commenting that for
most of the nation's history "the federal criminal law was limited in purpose to
the protection of federal property and restricted federal functions"). The pun-
ishment of common law crimes was reserved to the jurisdiction of the states.
Id. at 475.
12. According to the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit,
Authority to prosecute an individual is that government power which
most threatens personal liberty, for a prosecutor "has the power to
employ the full machinery of the state in scrutinizing any given indi-
vidual. Even if a defendant is ultimately acquitted, forced immersion
in criminal investigation and adjudication is a wrenching disruption
of everyday life."
In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 487 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (quoting Young v.
United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 814 (1987)), rev'd
sub nom. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); see also Robert W.
Gordon, Imprudence and Partisanship: Starr's OIC and the Clinton-
Lewinsky Affair, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 639, 642 (1999) ("[The arsenal of
investigative and punitive weapons modern prosecutors may deploy
against lawbreakers and potential witnesses is devastating in its destruc-
tive powers.").
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and prosecutorial resources on petty criminals, white-collar
criminals, loan sharks, cyberspace pirates, or violent street
gangs. These judgments are informed by the U.S. Attorney's
prosecutorial philosophy and her assessment of the particular
problems and vulnerabilities within her district.13 Under our
constitutional system, an official who is politically accountable
must make these decisions.
The procedure for appointing U.S. Attorneys is established
in 28 U.S.C. §§ 541 and 546.14 Normally, the President ap-
points each U.S. Attorney with the advice and consent of the
United States Senate. 15 In the event that a vacancy occurs in
the office of a U.S. Attorney, the Attorney General is authorized
to appoint a U.S. Attorney to serve for up to 120 days, 16 within
which time, in an ideal world, the President could be expected
to nominate, and the Senate to confirm, a successor to the of-
fice. 17 If this process does not produce a new, duly nominated
and confirmed U.S. Attorney, however, federal law vests the
authority to name a successor in the federal district court in
which there is a vacancy.'8
This appointment mechanism has an intuitive appeal and
initially appears to comply with the letter of the United States
Constitution's Appointments Clause, but closer scrutiny raises
serious concerns about such a procedure. Whether an ap-
pointment is valid under the Appointments Clause depends on
whether a U.S. Attorney is a "principal" or an "inferior" offi-
cer. 19 If U.S. Attorneys are regarded as principal officers, then
the Constitution prescribes but one method for their appoint-
ment: nomination by the President and confirmation by the
Senate.20 Even if U.S. Attorneys are deemed inferior officers,
their appointments by federal district court judges are invalid
under the Appointments Clause if such appointments are con-
13. See ExECUTIvE OFFICE FOR U.S. ATTORNEYS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT 1 (2000) ("Each
United States Attorney is responsible for establishing law enforcement priori-
ties within his or her district.").
14. 28 U.S.C. §§ 541, 546 (1994) (establishing procedures for the appoint-
ment of U.S. Attorneys).
15. Id. § 541(a).
16. Id. § 546(c).
17. See id. § 546(c)(1).
18. Id. § 546(d).
19. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also infra Part III (discussing the
distinction between principal and inferior officers).
20. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
[Vol. 86:363
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sidered incongruous with appropriate judicial activity.21 Fi-
nally, even if such an appointment mechanism satisfies the
Appointments Clause, it is unconstitutional if it violates the
separation-of-powers doctrine.22
This Article argues that, under any of these three scenar-
ios, the court appointment of U.S. Attorneys is inconsistent
with the United States Constitution. Part I establishes the
relevant factual predicate by describing the history of federal
law enforcement, the place of the U.S. Attorney in that system,
and the unique relationship between the U.S. Attorneys and
the Attorney General. Part II provides the legal framework for
assessing the appointment of U.S. Attorneys by exploring the
structure and operation of the Appointments Clause and ex-
plaining the processes for appointing and removing U.S. Attor-
neys. Part III reviews the judicial precedents that have distin-
guished between principal and inferior officers and shows how
the responsibilities conferred on U.S. Attorneys are inconsis-
tent with inferior officer status. Therefore, this Part concludes
that U.S. Attorneys, by virtue of their status as principal offi-
cers, must be nominated by the President and confirmed by the
Senate. Part IV argues that, even if U.S. Attorneys can be con-
sidered inferior officers, their appointment by the district court
judges before whom they will be required to appear is incon-
gruous with appropriate judicial activity. Part V concludes
that, even if the mechanism providing for court-appointed U.S.
Attorneys satisfies the Appointments Clause, it nonetheless
violates the separation-of-powers doctrine by disturbing the
balance of power between the executive and legislative
branches and defeating the accountability intended under the
Constitution. The Article concludes by suggesting steps to im-
prove the processes of appointing U.S. Attorneys.
I. THE OFFICE OF U.S. ATTORNEY
A. THE HISTORY OF FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
The United States has not always had a centrally adminis-
tered criminal enforcement system. The First Congress ini-
tially occupied itself with the creation of the "great depart-
ments" of Foreign Affairs, War, and Treasury.23  These
21. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 675-76 (1988).
22. Id.
23. See MEADOR, supra note 5, at 5 (discussing the First Congress's de-
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departments embodied the most basic responsibilities en-
trusted to the newly established executive: a single, national
voice in dealings with other nations; a plan for the common de-
fense; and a national treasury, as finances under the Articles of
Confederation had been a critical weakness.2 4 But Congress,
even as it created the offices and departments of the federal
government, sought to limit the power of the President through
the structure of the executive branch.25 For instance, Congress
controlled the power of the purse and remained wary of dele-
gating too much fiscal authority to the President.26 This may
explain why the Department of the Treasury was not named an
"executive" department, as were the Departments of Foreign
Affairs and War.27 Moreover, in contrast to the relatively free
bates over the structure of the executive branch ("It is of large yet overlooked
historical significance that the [Flirst Congress did not deal with the office of
Attorney General in connection with the creation of the executive departments
of the new government.")); see also Susan Low Bloch, The Early Role of the At-
torney General in Our Constitutional Scheme: In the Beginning There Was
Pragmatism, 1989 DUKE L.J. 561, 572-75.
That these offices were considered vital to the existence of any na-
tional government is illustrated by their creation under the Articles of Confed-
eration. By 1781, Congress had established the executive departments of War,
Foreign Affairs, and Finance. See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B.
Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 600-
01 (1994).
24. See CUMMNGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 11, at 1-2 ("The old Articles
of Confederation had conferred upon the Continental Congress authority over
peace and war, but even then the states might veto requests for men and
money.").
25. See Harold J. Krent, Executive Control Over Criminal Law Enforce-
ment: Some Lessons from History, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 286 (1989).
26. See Bloch, supra note 23, at 576-78; Krent, supra note 25, at 284
("Congress'[s] control over the appropriations process affords the legislature a
potent weapon with which to influence the Executive's criminal law enforce-
ment authority."). Congress has an explicit, constitutional grant of authority
over national finances: "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law .... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.
7.
27. See Bloch, supra note 23, at 576 & n.50 (noting that the Departments
of Foreign Affairs and War were labeled as executive departments, whereas
the Department of the Treasury was not). Moreover, while the statutes creat-
ing the Secretaries of War and Foreign Affairs explicitly called for presidential
direction and control, the statute defining the duties of the Secretary of the
Treasury "was silent on the subject of presidential direction." Gerhard Cas-
per, An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions and Practices, 30
WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 240 (1989). However, the Secretary of the Treasury
was removable by the President, see id. at 240, and was paid according to a
schedule set for "Executive Office[s]." See Bloch, supra note 23, at 576 n.50.
For competing interpretations of these discrepancies, compare Calabresi &
368
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hand granted to the President in organizing the "executive"
Departments of Foreign Affairs and War, Congress took a much
more active role in the internal structure of the Department of
the Treasury.28
In contrast, law enforcement had not emerged as a founda-
tional principle in the creation of the new national government.
Although enforcement of federal laws had been a problem un-
der the Articles of Confederation2 9 and the supremacy of fed-
eral law had been conclusively established by the Constitu-
tion,30 the states enjoyed concurrent jurisdiction to enforce
federal laws31 and law enforcement was not necessarily viewed
as a national issue requiring a national solution.32 With law
enforcement comes discretion, and with discretion, the poten-
tial for abuse. Those responsible for defining the early role of
Prakash, supra note 23, at 647-55, with Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein,
The President and the Administration, 94 COLUm. L. REV. 1, 34-38 (1994).
28. See Bloch, supra note 23, at 576 (citing Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, § 1,
1 Stat. 65, 65 (creating and defining offices of the Secretary of the Treasury,
Comptroller, Auditor, Treasurer, Register, and Assistant to the Secretary)).
This desire for more detailed control may signify Congress's desire to guard its
control over the purse.
The Framers had even considered a proposal to have the Treasurer
appointed by a joint resolution of the two houses of Congress. See 2 MAX
FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 233 (1911).
There is some evidence that the House of Representatives viewed the Secre-
tary of the Treasury as an extension of its appropriations authority. For ex-
ample, upon Alexander Hamilton's confirmation as the first Secretary of the
Treasury in July 1789, Congress disbanded its Ways and Means Committee
and did not establish a standing committee on Ways and Means until 1795.
See Casper, supra note 27, at 241 ("In the Congress, the Secretary of the
Treasury was seen as an indispensable, direct arm of the House in regard to
its responsibilities for revenues and appropriations.").
29. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 21, at 138-39 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961).
30. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause states,
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.
Id.
31. See Krent, supra note 25, at 303-07; see also Bloch, supra note 23, at
570 (describing the extensive concurrent state jurisdiction in the early federal
scheme and concluding that "very little [jurisdiction] was exclusively federal").
32. See CUIMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 11, at 475 (stating that
"[tihe policy and practice of a hundred and thirty years or more prior to the
[First] World War had left the punishment of common law crimes to the
states").
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the federal government were in no hurry to confer broad crimi-
nal enforcement powers to it.
33
Moreover, even to the extent that law enforcement was
recognized as a federal responsibility, the First Congress 34 was
unsure that law enforcement was properly or exclusively an ex-
ecutive-branch function.35 Draft legislation was considered
that would have vested the authority in the Supreme Court to
appoint the Attorney General and the authority to appoint U.S.
Attorneys (then known as district attorneys)36 in the federal
33. See Bell, supra note 7, at 1051 (describing the First Congress's fear of
a strong, centralized federal law enforcement apparatus as one possible motive
for their creation of a weak Attorney General); Bloch, supra note 23, at 568-71
(stating that the creation of a weak Attorney General was consistent with the
First Congress's reluctance to create a strong federal judicial system).
34. The debates and enactments of the First Congress have long been re-
garded as significant indications of the original meaning of the Constitution.
See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 723-24 (1986) (stating the decisions
of the First Congress afford "contemporaneous and weighty evidence" of the
meaning of the Constitution (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790
(1983))); cf Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 27, at 13-14 n.47 (questioning the
"usefulness of post-enactment practice for interpreting the meaning of the
Constitution" and discussing the Alien and Sedition Acts).
35. See Krent, supra note 25, at 286-87. The characterization of where
law enforcement sits in our tripartite government has been the subject of
much scholarship and intense debate. Many view law enforcement, and in
particular, criminal prosecutions, as "core" executive functions. See, e.g., Mor-
rison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 706 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Governmental
investigation and prosecution of crimes is a quintessentially executive func-
tion."); Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 23, at 658-61 (arguing that presiden-
tial practice and English tradition support the argument that prosecutorial
authority is inherently an executive function). Others have argued persua-
sively that law enforcement occupies a more ambiguous position, where the
legislative, judicial, and executive branches can all play a constructive role.
See, e.g., Bloch, supra note 23, at 562-63 (arguing that history is indeterminate
with regard to exclusivity of executive authority over prosecutions); Lessig &
Sunstein, supra note 27, at 14-22 (recounting the historical placement of law
enforcement authority in different power structures).
This Article does not attempt to discern which of these competing
theories has the stronger claim on the Framers' intentions. Instead, it de-
scribes the history of law enforcement as one helpful tool in understanding the
complex relationship between the U.S. Attorneys and the Attorney General.
Although this history is not determinative of the relationship today, it is still
significant. The historical roles and responsibilities of the U.S. Attorneys, and
the U.S. Attorneys' relationships to other executive-branch officials, are rele-
vant to understanding the stature U.S. Attorneys enjoy today and assist in
analyzing the propriety of the U.S. Attorneys' court appointment.
36. Throughout this discussion of the history of federal law enforcement,
"U.S. Attorney," the contemporary title, is used interchangeably with "district
attorney," the original title of the same office. See Bell, supra note 7, at 1051
(noting that U.S. Attorneys were once known as district attorneys); Bloch, su-
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district courts. 37 In the provision that creates the Attorney
General in the Judiciary Act of 1789, there is no indication that
the Attorney General should report to or take orders from the
President.38 Initially, it was unclear whether the Attorney
General was even considered an executive-branch official 39 and
President Washington's Attorney General did not attend cabi-
net meetings until 1792.40 It appeared Congress believed "that
the Attorney General would take orders from Congress, as well
as the President, in representing the interests of the United
States."41 Indeed, the early debates concerning federal law en-
forcement focused less on formal separation-of-powers princi-
ples and more on practical solutions.4 2 For example, while
pra note 23, at 567 (same).
37. 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES 490 (1971); Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the
Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 108-09 (1923); see also
Bloch, supra note 23, at 567 & n.24, 571 & n.32 (examining the available legis-
lative history of the appointment provisions in the Judiciary Act of 1789).
38. See An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States (Judi-
ciary Act of 1789), ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 93 (1789). Although the Judiciary
Act of 1789 required the Attorney General to give legal opinions when re-
quested to do so by the President, id., it is in contrast to the legislation defin-
ing the duties of the Secretaries of War and Foreign Affairs, which made
presidential direction and control explicit. See Bloch, supra note 23, at 572
("In establishing the two 'great executive departments' of Foreign Affairs and
War, Congress was notably concerned with assuring presidential control and
limiting congressional interference with presidential powers." (citing 1
ANNALS OF CONG. 368 (J. Gales ed. 1790))).
39. See, e.g., Bloch, supra note 23, at 578-80 (describing the ambiguous
relation of the Attorney General to the rest of the executive branch).
40. See CUMI IINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 11, at 25; MEADOR, supra
note 5, at 6; see also EASBY-SMITH, supra note 7, at 4-5 (noting that the Attor-
ney General was not formally recognized as the fourth-ranking cabinet mem-
ber until 1886). The Attorney General has traditionally attended cabinet
meetings since 1792.
In 1828, there was some question as to whether the Attorney General
should tender his resignation, as was expected of other cabinet members, at
the end of the Quincy-Adams administration. CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, su-
pra note 11, at 98. This was only the second transition from one party to an-
other, the first being Jefferson's ascension to the presidency in 1801. Former
President James Monroe suggested to Attorney General William Wirt that,
while other cabinet members could be expected to resign, Wirt need not tender
his resignation, because "[the President has less connection with, and less re-
sponsibility for the performance of' the duties of the Attorney General. Id.
(citing Letter from James Monroe to William Wirt). Nonetheless, Wirt re-
signed on the eve of Andrew Jackson's inauguration. Id.
41. Bloch, supra note 23, at 581.
42. See id. at 563 ("[The Framers and the early legislators] created a uni-
tary Presidency, but did not mandate complete presidential control over all
administrative offices that Congress might establish. Their approach to ques-
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:363
deputy marshals were appointed by the executive branch, they
were removable by the courts.43
The establishment of even the most rudimentary criminal
enforcement administration was taken up by Congress only as
an adjunct to the creation of federal courts, as opposed to dur-
ing the earlier deliberations on the form of the "executive de-
partments."" Although the offices of the Attorney General and
the district attorneys were created pursuant to the Judiciary
Act of 1789, 45 it should be remembered that the federal judici-
ary initially established by Congress was itself very limited.
Federal courts exercised only a very limited portion of the ju-
risdiction authorized by the Constitution and almost no juris-
diction exclusive from the states.46 The Framers of the Consti-
tution grappled over whether to create a federal judiciary in
addition to the Supreme Court and ultimately left that deter-
mination to Congress, but it was presumed that most of the
litigation in the country-criminal as well as civil-would con-
tions of control was neither rigid nor doctrinaire. On the contrary, it was re-
markably subtle and pragmatic.").
43. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 27; see also Krent, supra note 25,
at 286.
Although the court appointment and removal of U.S. Marshals might
at first blush seem a convenient and probative comparison to the appointment
of U.S. Attorneys, the role and responsibilities of U.S. Marshals are not analo-
gous to those of the U.S. Attorneys. The primary functions of U.S. Marshals
are "holding people in detention, serving subpoenas and civil summonses, and
providing some protective services for government witnesses. The U. S. Mar-
shal no longer performs any investigative fimction." WHITNEY NORTH
SEYMOUR, JR., UNITED STATES ATTORNEY: AN INSIDE VIEW OF "JUSTICE" IN
AMERICA UNDER THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION 23 (1975); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 566 (1994) (defining powers and duties of U.S. Marshals). "[M]arshals them-
selves had become almost exclusively court officers when the First Congress
met." CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 11, at 17; see also Ex Parte Sie-
bold, 100 U.S. 371, 397 (1879) ("The marshal is pre-eminently the officer of
the courts .... ").
Even though U.S. Marshals are much more akin to court officers than
are U.S. Attorneys, the Attorney General is given sole authority to appoint
marshals in the event of a vacancy. 28 U.S.C. § 562 (1994). The district court
is granted no authority with respect to filling vacancies in the office of U.S.
Marshal. See id.
44. See MEADOR, supra note 5, at 5 ("The question of legal counsel for the
government was considered only in the context of the creation of the judici-
ary.").
45. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35.
46. See CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 11, at 15; see also Bloch,
supra note 23, at 568 (commenting that it is not surprising that the Attorney
General was so weak "in view of the First Congress's general reluctance to
create a strong federal judicial system").
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tinue to be conducted in state courts.47
The original office of the Attorney General created by the
First Congress was a far cry from the powerful position it is to-
day. The Attorney General was vested with the authority "to
prosecute and conduct all suits in the Supreme Court in which
the United States shall be concerned, and to give his advice and
opinion upon questions of law when required by the President
of the United States, or when requested by the heads of any of
the departments."48 In addition, consistent with Congress's
ambivalence about the creation of a federal law enforcement es-
tablishment,49 the Attorney General was hamstrung by limited
resources and no direct control over the district attorneys.50
The Attorney General position was not even considered a full-
time endeavor; the Attorney General was paid only $1500 per
47. See Bloch, supra note 23, at 568-69; see also Krent, supra note 25, at
305-07 (discussing early enforcement of federal criminal laws by state officials
and concurrent state court jurisdiction over criminal prosecutions under fed-
eral laws).
During the Whiskey Rebellion, civil cases to collect federal revenues
were litigated in the state courts of Pennsylvania, while criminal prosecutions
were handled in federal court. See CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 11,
at 44.
48. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35 (emphasis added). The entire statu-
tory description of the Attorney General's responsibilities was included in a
single paragraph of the Judiciary Act of 1789:
And there shall... be appointed a meet person, learned in the law, to
act as attorney-general for the United States, who shall be sworn or
affirmed to a faithful execution of his office; whose duty it shall be to
prosecute and conduct all suits in the Supreme Court in which the
United States shall be concerned, and to give his advice and opinion
upon questions of law when required by the President of the United
States, or when requested by the heads of any of the departments,
touching any matters that may concern their departments, and shall
receive such compensation for his services as shall by law be pro-
vided.
Id.
Attorney General Homer Cummings opined that this limited jurisdic-
tion may have been accidental. CUmIINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 11, at
16. Cummings suggested that it may have been incidental to the proposal to
have the Supreme Court appoint the Attorney General but that, even when
this provision was rejected, "the wording of the section was not revised and the
Attorney General remained charged only with the duty of appearing before the
Supreme Court." Id.
49. See Bell, supra note 7, at 1051 ("Those early representatives vividly
remembered the tyranny that could result from strong central enforcement of
laws, and they hesitated to create machinery in the executive branch that pos-
sibly could serve as an engine of oppression.").
50. See EASBY-SMITH, supra note 7, at 6; MEADOR, supra note 5, at 6.
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year,51 while the Secretaries of the Treasury and Foreign Af-
fairs both were paid $3500,52 and the Secretary of War received
$3000.53 Furthermore, the Attorney General was expected to
maintain a private law practice,54 was not authorized to hire a
single clerk, and was not appropriated any money for supplies,
office space, or even expenses. 55 Beginning with President
Washington and the first Attorney General, Edmund Randolph,
every President and Attorney General requested appropria-
tions for the basic provisions of a clerk and a budget for sup-
plies, but Congress, with an eye on the federal budget and a
particular concern that law enforcement remain primarily with
the states, consistently refused.56 Even if the Attorney General
51. See Bloch, supra note 23, at 567 n.21 (citing Act of September 23,
1789, ch. 18, § 1, 1 Stat. 72, 72 (Act setting compensation for the judiciary)).
52. Id. (citing Act of September 11, 1789, ch. 13, § 1, 1 Stat. 67, 67 (Act
setting the salaries of executive officials)).
53. Id.
54. See id. at 567. According to James Easby-Smith,
[The meager salary] was due to the arguments that the duties of the
Attorney-General would be very light, that he could and would engage
in private practice, and that the prestige of the office would be so
great that it would be well worth the while of any lawyer to accept the
office with only a nominal compensation.
EASBY-SMITH, supra note 7, at 5. Many of the early Attorneys General did not
live in Washington, "but remained at their homes and transmitted their advice
and opinions by mail." Id. at 8.
The Attorney General was paid on a fee-basis for representing the
government outside the Supreme Court. For example, Attorney General Wil-
liam Wirt was paid $1500 for prosecuting pirates in Baltimore and on another
occasion was paid $1000 for prosecuting mail robbers. CUMMINGS &
MCFARLAND, supra note 11, at 90. Incumbent Attorneys General argued
many early and important Supreme Court cases representing paying clients in
their private practices. Id. at 154.
Caleb Cushing, Attorney General under President Franklin Pierce,
became the first full-time Attorney General when, in 1853, Congress raised his
salary to $8000, commensurate with other cabinet secretaries' salaries. Id. at
155.
55. See EASBY-SMITH, supra note 7, at 6 (noting that, in addition to the
legal duties of the office, the Attorney General "was obliged to perform all the
physical labor of the office, for Congress had failed to provide for him clerical
assistance, and he had not even a single clerk"); see also Bloch, supra note 23,
at 586-88 (describing the challenges facing the first Attorney General, Ed-
mund Randolph). Edmond Randolph also served as George Washington's per-
sonal, private attorney. CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 11, at 1.
56. See Bell, supra note 7, at 1051 (suggesting that, while early Con-
gresses were motivated by "frugality," a more important factor in denying the
repeated requests "was fear of a strong Attorney General"); Bloch, supra note
23, at 589 n.91 (arguing that an aversion to centralization thwarted attempts
to create a well-funded Attorney General's office); see also Krent, supra note
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had sufficient funds, Congress refused to grant the Attorney
General any authority to appoint, supervise, or direct district
attorneys, even though Congress gave district attorneys full
prosecutorial authority on behalf of the United States.57 The
Attorney General did not have responsibility for criminal
prosecutions and did not have any official role in determining
which cases would be brought or what positions would be ad-
vanced by the United States. The Attorney General, whose
litigation responsibilities were limited solely to representing
the United States before the Supreme Court, was relegated to
litigating on the basis of the records and reasoning developed in
lower court proceedings over which he had no control.58 '"The
Attorney General... had virtually no say in the positions
taken by the district attorneys in [federal criminal] suits, and
had little opportunity to coordinate the positions taken by the
district attorneys."59
As mentioned above, with the passage of the Judiciary Act
of 1789, Congress created the position of district attorney for
each judicial district.60 Early drafts of the Judiciary Act of
1789 granted the district courts the authority to appoint the
district attorney, but this provision did not survive.61 Although
25, at 286-90 (describing repeated attempts to consolidate legal representation
of the government under the Attorney General). The repeated entreaties of
various Presidents and Attorneys General to expand the staff and supervision
granted to the Attorney General are catalogued by James Easby-Smith.
EASBY-SMITH, supra note 7.
57. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35 (providing for district attorneys
in each judicial district "to prosecute... all delinquents for crimes and of-
fences, cognizable under the authority of the United States, and all civil ac-
tions in which the United States shall be concerned"); Bloch, supra note 23, at
567; see also MEADOR, supra note 5, at 6 (noting that Congress failed "to give
the Attorney General any control or supervision of the district attorneys"). In
the beginning, the Attorney General was not even involved in the selection or
appointment process of the U.S. Attorneys. EASBY-SMITH, supra note 7, at 38.
In fact, the State Department, exercising its early role somewhat akin to Brit-
ain's "Home Department," conducted all business and correspondence relating
to the selection and appointment of "district attorneys, marshals and other of-
ficials properly under the jurisdiction of the Attorney-General." Id. In 1850,
this work was transferred to the office of the Attorney General. Id. Nonethe-
less, officers of the Department of Justice received their commissions from the
Secretary of State until 1888, when this responsibility was finally transferred
to the Department of Justice. Id. at 39.
58. See Bell, supra note 7, at 1051.
59. Krent, supra note 25, at 286-87.
60. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35.
61. See Bloch, supra note 23, at 567 n.24; Warren, supra note 37, at 108-
09; supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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no appointment provision was included in the legislation as en-
acted, the President, consistent with the Appointments Clause,
assumed responsibility for nominating district attorneys and
submitted nominees to the advice and consent of the Senate.62
These district attorneys were charged with representing
the United States in all cases in which the United States had
an interest, despite their independence from central control.63
As Congress had enacted few federal criminal statutes, the dis-
trict attorneys conducted relatively few criminal prosecutions. 64
In fact, most of the district attorneys' early work involved debt
collection, and the first official grant of supervisory authority
over district attorneys was delegated to the Treasury Depart-
ment.65 Even this nominal grant of authority did not change
62. Bloch, supra note 23, at 567 n.24 ("[The Judiciary Act of 1789] did not
specify how the Attorney General or the district attorneys would be appointed.
The President nevertheless immediately assumed that responsibility, went to
the Senate for advice and consent, presumably reading [Airticle II, section 2 to
support and perhaps require this approach." (citation omitted)). Today, the
relevant appointment provisions are codified at 28 U.S.C. § 501 (Attorney
General) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 541, 546 (U.S. Attorneys).
63. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35 (defining the duty of a district
attorney to "prosecute in such district all delinquents for crimes and offences,
cognizable under the authority of the United States, and all civil actions in
which the United States shall be concerned"); see also Bell, supra note 7, at
1051 (remarking that the Judiciary Act of 1789 vested the U.S. Attorneys with
"exclusive[]" power with respect to "the enforcement of penal law and the rep-
resentation of the federal government in civil litigation at the trial level").
64. See CUMMINGS & McFARLAND, supra note 11, at 474-75.
65. See Act of Mar. 3, 1797, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 512, 512 (1797) (granting
the Comptroller of the Treasury authority to direct legal proceedings against
delinquent revenue officers); CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 11, at 74;
see also John G. Heinberg, Centralization in Federal Prosecutions, 15 MO. L.
REV. 246 (1950) (providing the history of Treasury Department supervision of
U.S. Attorneys); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 27, at 17 (discussing the rela-
tive independence of the Comptroller General).
The Department of the Treasury's supervision of government litiga-
tion was to persist for many years. Heinberg, supra, at 246. In 1828, the
Treasury Agent (successor to the Solicitor's responsibilities with respect to
overseeing district attorneys) supervised more than 3000 pending cases in
which the United States had an interest. CUMMmGS & MCFARLAND, supra
note 11, at 144. President Jackson, upon his inauguration in 1829, took up
the call to strengthen the Attorney General's supervisory authority. "But
Congress instead of carrying out the President's recommendations and in-
creasing the powers and duties of the Attorney-General, created, in 1830, the
office of Solicitor of the Treasury, giving to that officer control of civil suits in
which the Government was interested." EASBY-SMITH, supra note 7, at 11.
The Solicitor of the Treasury was granted the power "to instruct the district
attorneys in all matters and proceedings in which the United States was in-
terested." MEADOR, supra note 5, at 7 (citing Act of May 29, 1830, ch. 153, 4
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the district attorneys' ability to act as free agents, primarily be-
cause of their remote location and the limited means of com-
munication and transportation available during this time pe-
riod.66
Federal legal authority was distributed around the country
not only by virtue of the geographic dispersion of the district at-
torneys, but also by the subject matter of the various depart-
ments.67 As Congress created new departments, it invariably
vested each of them with a chief legal officer, known as the so-
licitor of the department.68 The resulting lack of coordination
meant the United States was unable to develop a coherent legal
strategy and could not ensure that compatible legal positions
were advocated in different cases.69 In support of the legisla-
tion that would create the Department of Justice, Representa-
tive Jenckes of Rhode Island described the results of having
many federal law offices operating independently of each other:
This host of officers, giving opinions or deciding questions [of law], are
[sic] not controlled by any common head to secure uniformity, and the
result is that no citizen, no lawyer, can ever learn what has been de-
cided, what are the rules governing any Department, bureau, or, offi-
cer; or if these could be learned, so great is the confusion and conflict
that we might as well attempt to read the whirlwind. 70
Eventually, this broad diffusion of authority over federal legal
affairs was recognized as being too expensive and generally
unworkable, but the process of consolidating supervision in the
office of the Attorney General was lengthy.71 The Attorney
Stat. 414 (1830)). The Attorney General was relegated to advising the Solici-
tor of the Treasury only when the Solicitor requested such assistance.
CUrMIINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 11, at 146 (citing Act of May 29, 1830,
ch. 153, § 10, 4 Stat. 414, 416 (1830)).
66. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 27, at 70 ("[I]n conditions like those
of the founding, it made little sense to vest in the President centralized control
over district attorneys, given their distance from the center, and it would be
fully understandable that they would function relatively independently of the
President."); see also Stephen L. Carter, The Independent Counsel Mess, 102
HARV. L. REV. 105, 126 (1988) ("In the first decades of the Republic, federal
prosecutors ... had no direct superior in the federal government, and they
acted with considerable independence . ").
67. See MEADOR, supra note 5, at 9-10 & n.2.
68. See id. at 9 (citing CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 11, at 220-
21); Bell, supra note 7, at 1052.
69. See NANCY V. BAKER, CONFLICTING LOYALTIES: LAW AND POLITICS IN
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, 1789-1990, at 49 (1992).
70. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3038 (1870).
71. See CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 11, at 220-22.
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General was provided with a single clerk in 1819.72 In 1861,
the Attorney General was nominally granted general supervi-
sory authority over the district attorneys,73 but the legislation
left ambiguities regarding to whom the district attorneys were
to report.74 In addition, Congress remained ambivalent about
the accumulation of so much power in the Attorney General
and refused to clarify the relations between the department
solicitors and the Attorney General. As a result, the depart-
ment solicitors remained in their respective departments' build-
ings and were subject to each department's hierarchy, illustrat-
ing that Congress was not yet committed to consolidating
effective control over the legal bureaucracy under the Attorney
General. 76 Finally, in 1870, Congress created the Department
of Justice.77 With the creation of the Justice Department, the
72. See Act of Mar. 3, 1819, ch. 54, 3 Stat. 496, 500 (1819). Congress had
approved the position two years earlier, but did not fund the newly created po-
sition of clerk to the Attorney General until 1819. See Bloch, supra note 23, at
619 n.185. By 1857, the Attorney General had a staff of twenty assistants,
mostly due to the Attorney General's responsibility to review the decisions of
the land commissions and to represent the government in land claims. See
CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 11, at 120-41.
73. Act of Aug. 2, 1861, ch. 37, § 1, 12 Stat. 285, 285 (1861). But cf
CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 11, at 219 (noting that, even after being
charged with the supervision of the district attorneys in 1861, "[o]nly in cases
of 'peculiar' importance did the Attorney General have time to advise district
attorneys"). Even after the Civil War, the district attorneys "remained all but
completely independent." Id. at 218. Attorney General Homer Cummings re-
counted an episode from 1882, where the district attorney for Washington,
D.C. allowed the grand jury to be dismissed (knowing that the statute of limi-
tations would soon expire) in order to frustrate the Attorney General's plans
for vigorous enforcement of postal fraud violators. See id. at 257.
74. CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 11, at 219-20; see also 20 Op.
Att'y Gen. 714, 715-16 (1894) (recognizing that the Department of the Treas-
ury, not the Department of Justice, had control over criminal prosecutions of
revenue fraud); Bloch, supra note 23, at 619 n.187.
75. See Bell, supra note 7, at 1054 ("Congress [exhibited] a curious am-
bivalence about the role of the Attorney General and the Department of Jus-
tice, appearing to give them total control over the nation's legal business on
the one hand but failing to take action necessary to make that control effective
on the other.").
76. Id.; see also CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 11, at 487.
77. Act of June 22, 1870, ch. 150, § 1, 16 Stat. 162, 162 (1870) ("[Tlhere
shall be, and is hereby, established an executive department of the govern-
ment of the United States, to be called the Department of Justice, of which the
Attorney-General shall be the head."); see also 28 U.S.C. § 501 (1994) (current
version) ("The Department of Justice is an executive department of the United
States . . ").
Congress did not give the Department of Justice its own building until
1934, so the Department of Justice took shape in offices in the Treasury De-
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Attorney General exercised, for the first time, definite supervi-
sion over the U.S. Attorneys.78 These events were the begin-
ning of the long struggle between central control and local
autonomy that still defines the relationship between the U.S.
Attorneys and "Main Justice."7 9
partment building and in disparate, rented space across Washington. Bloch,
supra note 23, at 619 n.188; see also EASBY-SMITH, supra note 7, at 21 (citing
Congressional findings that in 1899 the building occupied by the Justice De-
partment was "too small for its purpose, [was] unsafe, over-crowded, and dan-
gerously over-loaded, and [had] been pronounced unsafe after examination by
the proper officials of the Treasury Department"). As a result, the department
solicitors remained in their own buildings, further complicating the Depart-
ment's efforts to unify the government's legal representation under the Attor-
ney General's command. Id.
78. § 16, 16 Stat. at 164 ("IThe Attorney General shall have supervision
of the conduct and proceedings of the various attorneys for the United States
in the respective judicial districts ... ."); see also EASBY-SMITH, supra note 7,
at 19-20. But cf Bell, supra note 7, at 1054 (arguing that, at least with re-
spect to attorneys assigned to other executive departments, Congress contin-
ued to take "steps that showed it had not been serious about centralizing all
legal activity under the Attorney General").
79. The Department of Justice management in Washington, D.C. is
known as "Main Justice." See JIM MCGEE & BRIAN DUFFY, MAIN JUsTICE:
THE MEN AND WOMEN WHO ENFORCE THE NATION'S CRIMINAL LAWS AND
GUARD ITS LIBERTIES 7 (1996); Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law,
Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement Authority, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757,
781 (1999). The term "Main Justice" refers not only to the historic 1934 build-
ing that serves as the Department's headquarters, but also more generally to
the Department's management as well as the "litigating divisions," which are
located in Washington, D.C. and directed by an Assistant Attorney General.
See MEADOR, supra note 5, at 15. The litigating divisions are the Criminal
Division, the Civil Division, the Civil Rights Division, the Environment and
Natural Resources Division, the Antitrust Division, and the Tax Division. See
id. at 15-17.
The geographic distance between Main Justice and the U.S. Attorneys'
offices is indicative of a larger difference in perspective. Charles Ruff charac-
terized the distinction between Main Justice and the field:
[T]he Criminal Division lawyer is trained to respond to the demands
of the Department [of Justice] and its national policies and practices,
while the [Assistant United States [Aittorney must respond to the
needs of his community, of the law enforcement agencies who bring
him cases, and of the judges of his district ....
Charles F.C. Ruff, Federal Prosecution of Local Corruption: A Case Study in
the Making of Law Enforcement Policy, 65 GEO. L.J. 1171, 1207 (1977). This is
perhaps an idealized view. A former U.S. Attorney characterized intervention
by Main Justice as more nuisance than technical assistance: "A good U.S. At-
torney's office ... is usually much better equipped to handle a complex crimi-
nal prosecution than the young trial attorneys from the Department of Justice,
who travel around the country primarily because they are looking for court-
room experience." SEYMIOUR, supra note 43, at 48.
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B. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY
The history discussed above informs the contemporary op-
eration of the various U.S. Attorneys' offices. In part because
U.S. Attorneys operated without interference from Washington,
D.C. for one hundred years, they retain an autonomy and inde-
pendence from Washington, D.C. that is "perhaps unmatched
by any other field service in the federal government."80 There
are ninety-three different U.S. Attorneys around the country,
making coordination and control difficult.81 In addition, U.S.
Attorneys have a political base outside the executive-branch
chain of command they officially serve: Senators, particularly
those of the President's political party, exercise a customary
privilege to influence the nominating process.82 This independ-
ent political base distinguishes U.S. Attorneys from traditional
subordinates and bolsters their autonomy from Main Justice.83
The relationship between U.S. Attorneys and the Attorney
General has been refined over time by statute, regulation, and
practice. It is clear today that the Attorney General has ulti-
mate authority over U.S. Attorneys.8 4 The Attorney General
can assert control over a given case or investigation by direct-
ing more immediate subordinates to supervise closely the U.S.
Attorney's handling of a case, or assistants can be dispatched
from Main Justice to conduct the litigation directly.85 Nonethe-
less, U.S. Attorneys continue to exercise significant independ-
ent authority.8 6 Although the Attorney General is technically
80. EISENSTEIN, supra note 6, at 11. According to Daniel Meador,
Because U.S. Attorneys were not brought under the Attorney General
until 1870 and because they come into office through presidential ap-
pointment with heavy senatorial involvement, an aura of independ-
ence and autonomy has grown up around these offices. This has al-
ways made it difficult to coordinate their work effectively with
departmental policies.
MEADOR, supra note 5, at 17
81. See MEADOR, supra note 5, at 17.
82. See infra Part II.B (discussing senatorial courtesy).
83. See MEADOR, supra note 5, at 138-40 (comments of Griffin Bell, former
Attorney General, and Philip Heymann, former Assistant Attorney General
and Deputy Attorney General).
84. 28 U.S.C. § 519 (1994) (directing the Attorney General to "super-
vise... [and] direct all United States [Aittorneys ... in the discharge of their
respective duties").
85. See 28 U.S.C. § 518(b) (1994) (authorizing the Attorney General to
remove U.S. Attorneys from particular cases when she believes that it would
be "in the interests of the United States").
86. For a discussion of the broad discretion exercised by prosecutors gen-
erally, see James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94
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empowered to direct any litigation from Main Justice, the scale
of federal law enforcement activities makes the possibility of
such interference remote,87 and while there is an enumerated
list of actions for which a U.S. Attorney is directed to seek ap-
proval, 88 for the most part, prosecutorial judgment calls are
within the province of the U.S. Attorneys. This means that in-
vestigations are undertaken, indictments filed, and criminal
defendants prosecuted and convicted under the supervision of a
U.S. Attorney without giving notice to or receiving approval
from the Attorney General or Main Justice.8 9 As one observer
concluded, "[Tlhe prosecutorial discretion of the U.S. Attorney
is vast and unchecked by any formal, external constraints or
regulatory mechanisms." 90 In the words of another commenta-
tor,
HARV. L. REv. 1521, 1524-37 (1981).
87. There are approximately 2500 Attorneys assigned to "Main Justice" in
Washington, D.C. and approximately 5000 Attorneys in the various U.S. At-
torneys' offices. Justice Mgmt. Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, 2000 Budget Sum-
mary, available at http'J/vww.usdoj.gov/jmd/2k-summary/2ktoc.html (last vis-
ited Nov. 8, 2001). In 1999, the ninety-four U.S. Attorneys' offices filed 50,779
criminal indictments against 71,560 defendants. EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR U.S.
ATTORNEYS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 12.
For an interesting discussion on how the expanded scale of federal law
enforcement is affecting the role of the U.S. Attorney, see Panel Discussion:
The Prosecutor's Role in Light of Expanding Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 26
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 657 (1999).
88. See, e.g., U.S. ATrORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 6, § 9-2.136 (requiring
prior authorization for overseas terrorism cases); id. § 9-110.101 (same for
RICO charges); id. § 9-2.400 (listing prosecutorial decisions requiring prior
approval).
89. The public record does not evidence an accurate assessment of the
relative authority of U.S. Attorneys and Main Justice. Because prosecutorial
discretion is cloaked in secrecy and because of the institutional loyalty of De-
partment of Justice employees, the public rarely knows when Washington,
D.C. is directing prosecutive decisions or even when a struggle for control has
occurred. James Eisenstein's study of the U.S. Attorneys contains a lengthy
discussion of the "undercurrent of tension and subdued hostility" that charac-
terizes most interactions between the U.S. Attorneys' offices and Main Justice.
EISENSTEIN, supra note 6, at 58. See generally id. at 54-125 (describing the
"fascinating and complex relations between [the U.S. Attorneys] and the De-
partment of Justice"). Eisenstein's Counsel for the United States remains the
seminal study of the U.S. Attorneys and their relationship to the Department
of Justice, but even this book is forced to rely on anonymous, anecdotal evi-
dence because of the dearth of recorded evidence relating to the endemic
struggles for control and autonomy that pervade this relationship. See id. at
56-58 (quoting anonymous sources).
90. Richard S. Frase, The Decision to File Federal Criminal Charges: A
Quantitative Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 47 U. Cm1. L. REV. 246, 303
(1980).
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The huge majority of criminal cases are brought, not by the litigating
divisions under the direct control of assistant attorneys general, but
by the ninety-four U.S. Attorneys' Offices, whose chiefs are appointed
by the [P]resident, usually with considerable local input. These of-
fices, whose prosecutorial authority predates the Justice Depart-
ment's, have a long tradition of independence from Washington.
9
This practice of decentralized criminal enforcement "has
acquired a special power in the context of the federal system, in
which even legislators of the [Piresident's party see U.S.
[Aittorneys as providing a critical counterweight to Washington
politics." 92 This is because of the U.S. Attorneys' ability to af-
fect Department of Justice policy and administration in a vari-
ety of ways.93 U.S. Attorneys exercise the entire range of
prosecutorial discretion literally on a daily basis. For example,
on behalf of the United States, U.S. Attorneys routinely decide
what crimes grand juries will investigate; what evidence and
witnesses will be presented to the grand jury;9 4 whether to pur-
sue an investigation, or to close one;95 what charges will be
brought, against whom, and on how many counts;96 and
91. Richman, supra note 79, at 781 (footnote omitted); see also U.S.
ATrTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 6, § 3-2.140 ("United States Attorneys con-
duct most of the trial work in which the United States is a party.").
92. Richman, supra note 79, at 808 (discussing the integrity exhibited by
the U.S. Attorneys' offices during the Watergate era); see also SEYMOUR, supra
note 43, at 76.
93. Appropriations for 1961: Hearings on the Dep't of Justice Before the
Subcomm. on the Dep'ts of State and Justice, the Judiciary, and Related Agen-
cies of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 86th Cong. 251 (1960) (statement
of John J. Rooney, Subcommittee Chairman) ("The U.S. [A]ttorneys are not
only the field representatives of the Department of Justice-they are the sole
instruments through which the [flederal laws are enforced .... The effective-
ness of their work materially influences the degree of respect and compliance
which the citizenry accords the Nation's laws.").
94. See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 44-45 (1992) (discussing
federal prosecutors' broad discretion in what to present to the grand jury).
95. Laurie L. Levenson, Working Outside the Rules: The Undefined Re-
sponsibilities of Federal Prosecutors, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 553, 560 (1999)
("The law does not pretend to dictate when a prosecutor may open an investi-
gation." (citing United States v. Luttrell, 923 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding
that probable cause or reasonable suspicion are not prerequisites for initiating
investigations of individuals))).
96. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (discussing
prosecutorial discretion in the charging decision); see also SEYMOUR, supra
note 43, at 47 ("Even when a grand jury returns an indictment, a United
States Attorney may refuse to sign the document, thereby rendering it null.");
Ellen S. Podgor, The Ethics and Professionalism of Prosecutors in Discretion-
ary Decisions, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1511, 1516-18 (2000) (discussing prosecu-
tors' "enormous power" in the charging decision).
As "determinate sentencing" narrows the range of available sentences
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whether charges will be dropped or reduced in exchange for a
guilty plea and cooperation. 97 Further, through the inevitable
rationing of limited resources, U.S. Attorneys set the federal
law enforcement agenda for their districts by determining
which crimes are worth major investigative resources, which
crimes are better left to the state criminal justice systems,
when justice will be served by leniency, and what magnitude of
fraud deserves to be prosecuted.98 Although U.S. Attorneys are
"functionally a part of the Department of Justice,"99 according
to Charles Ruff,
Each United States [Attorney ... to a greater or lesser degree,
operates independently of the Justice Department in a broad range of
his daily activities. He must do so because he is responsible for the
investigation and prosecution of hundreds of criminal cases in addi-
tion to substantial civil litigation, and it would be virtually impossible
for him to consult with the various divisions and sections of the De-
partment on each issue of policy or procedure. 100
In their capacity as the chief federal law enforcement officer in
each judicial district, U.S. Attorneys exercise significant and
largely independent prosecutorial discretion on behalf of the
for any particular crime, and parole and early release provisions are repealed,
the power of U.S. Attorneys increases. The charging decision, in which the
U.S. Attorney is imbued with vast discretion, determines the sentence in a
way that used to depend largely on judges' discretionary authority. See infra
notes 101-04 and accompanying text (discussing Sentencing Guidelines).
97. See 28 U.S.C. § 547 (1994) (defining the authority of U.S. Attorneys).
See generally Richman, supra note 79, at 759 (discussing standards of prosecu-
torial discretion and determining that "substantive federal criminal law un-
questionably delegates a staggering degree of discretionary authority to fed-
eral prosecutors").
98. See MEADOR, supra note 5, at 27-28. According to Daniel Meador,
If the Department of Justice is to function rationally, policies must be
established as to how the government's legal and investigative re-
sources are to be used. This necessarily involves decisions that some
laws are to be enforced more vigorously than others. These decisions
will be grounded in the general philosophy and policies of the Admini-
stration in power.
Id.; see also EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR U.S. ATTORNEYS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
supra note 13, at 1 (remarking on the policy-setting role of the U.S. Attorneys);
H. Richard Uviller, Poorer But Wiser: The Bar Looks Back at Its Contribution
to the Impeachment Spectacle, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 897, 899-902 (1999) (argu-
ing that limited resources and the need to allocate insufficient resources is
"essential in the development of the sense of justice,... and no decent prose-
cutor can survive without it").
99. Ruff, supra note 79, at 1201.
100. Id. at 1201-02 (footnote omitted); see also SEYMOUR, supra note 43, at
47 ("Mhe Attorney General is not in a position to review the facts and various
considerations that go into most cases, and the job therefore falls to the United
States Attorney.").
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federal government.
In addition to their traditional authority as prosecutors,
the power of U.S. Attorneys has risen dramatically since the in-
troduction of the Sentencing Guidelines. 10' The Sentencing
Guidelines aimed to decrease the disparity in sentences by re-
ducing judges' discretion when imposing sentences in individ-
ual cases.102 The Sentencing Guidelines, however, have merely
taken the exercise of discretion away from judges and placed it
into the hands of the prosecutors. In so doing, the conse-
quences of U.S. Attorneys' discretionary charging decisions
have been magnified. 0 3 Judge Harry T. Edwards of the Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit stated,
[The Guidelines have not eliminated sentencing discretion. Rather,
they have merely transferred it from district judges-who, whatever
their perceived failings, are at least impartial arbiters who make
their decisions on the record and subject to public scrutiny and appel-
late review-to less neutral parties who rarely are called to account
for the discretion they wield.104
As a result, the discretion to ensure that the punishment fairly
101. Pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3551, the
"Sentencing Commission" was created to "establish a range of determinate
sentences for categories of offenses and defendants according to various speci-
fied factors." Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 368 (1989). The guide-
lines are "binding on the courts." Id. at 367. If the sentencing court exercises
its discretion to depart from the applicable guideline, it must "state its reasons
for the sentence imposed" and "the 'specific reason' for imposing a sentence
different from that described in the guideline." Id. at 367-68.
102. See Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines:
Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1696-
98 (1992).
103. See Gary T. Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining
the Effectiveness of Determinate Sentencing Reform, 81 CAL. L. REV. 61, 72-73
(1993) (arguing that mandatory sentences strengthen prosecutors' ability to
secure plea bargains); see also Levenson, supra note 95, at 565 ("While the
formal act of sentencing rests with the court, a prosecutor's charging decisions
very much will dictate what the judge's options are at the time of sentenc-
ing.").
104. United States v. Harrington, 947 F.2d 956, 966-67 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(Edwards, J., concurring); see also Panel Discussion: The Expanding Prosecu-
torial Role from Trial Counsel to Investigator and Administrator, 26 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 679, 686 (1999) (comments of U.S. District Judge John Martin, Jr.
(S.D.N.Y.)) ("[Wihen you put into the hands of one person the decision of what
crime to investigate, who to prosecute, and what the sentence should be, you
have taken out of the system any check or balance."); Richman, supra note 79,
at 763 ("Congress's creation (or approval) of a sentencing scheme that puts
such a high premium on prosecutorial favor has thus contributed significantly
to the movement of effective lawmaking authority from the courts to the ex-
ecutive branch." (footnote omitted)).
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fits the crime, long the province of judges, is now exercised
primarily by U.S. Attorneys.
Fairly characterized, the U.S. Attorney position is one of
awesome power and immense discretion. 10 5 These discretion-
ary powers led Attorney General Robert Jackson to conclude
that "[tihe prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, and
reputation than any other person in America."10 6 Because of
this power and its attendant discretion, it is important that
federal prosecutors remain independent of partisan battles.
But it is just as important that they be accountable through po-
litical channels. Thus, in our federal system, U.S. Attorneys
always have been nominated by the President and confirmed by
the Senate. To determine whether a court is also permitted to
appoint an official who exercises the authority and discretion of
the U.S. Attorney requires an examination of the Appointments
Clause of the United States Constitution.
II. STRUCTURE, HISTORY AND OPERATION OF THE
APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE
The Constitution establishes the process for the appoint-
ment of government officers:
[The President] by and with the Advice and Consent of the Sen-
ate,... shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Con-
suls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the
United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise pro-
vided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress
may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they
think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the
105. In his dissenting opinion in Morrison, Justice Scalia opined that the
prosecutor's power and discretion are so unique that "[o]nly someone who has
worked in the field of law enforcement can fully appreciate the vast power and
the immense discretion that are placed in the hands of a prosecutor with re-
spect to the objects of his investigation." Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 727
(1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In the words of Attorney General Robert Jack-
son,
One of the greatest difficulties of the position of prosecutor is that he
must pick his cases, because no prosecutor can even investigate all of
the cases in which he receives complaints.... What every prosecutor
is practically required to do is to select the cases for prosecution and
to select those in which the offense is the most flagrant, the public
harm the greatest, and the proof the most certain.
Attorney General Robert Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, Address Delivered
at the Second Annual Conference of United States Attorneys (Apr. 1, 1940)
[hereinafter Jackson Address], reprinted in 24 J. AM. JUDIcATURE SoclY 18, 19
(1940), quoted in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 727-28 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
106. Jackson Address, supra note 105, at 18.
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Heads of Departments. 107
By its terms, the Appointments Clause applies to all officers of
the United States "regardless of the kind or extent of power to
be held by the officials being appointed."0 8 The courts have de-
fined an officer under the Appointments Clause as "any ap-
pointee [of the United States government] exercising signifi-
cant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States."1 09
For those considered principal (i.e., not inferior) officers, 110 the
Appointments Clause provides a single mechanism for ap-
pointment: nomination by the President and confirmation by
the Senate."' This interaction constitutes an important com-
ponent of the relationship between the President and the Sen-
ate, and more generally, between the President and Congress.
Currently, there are more than 1200 high-level executive-
branch positions that are subject to the confirmation process. 12
Executive-branch appointments in particular represent an
important opportunity to set the tenor and agenda of govern-
ment administration:
The nomination power.., enables the [P]resident to imprint
presidential priorities or views onto the policymaking process through
the appointments of every "Officer of the United States," many of
whom wield significant policymaking authority. For instance,
through the nominations of all U.S. Attorneys, a [Piresident may in-
fluence the enforcement of the federal criminal laws by, for example,
helping to determine which laws are enforced more vigorously and by
which level of government.
113
107. U.S. CONST./art. I1, § 2, cl. 2.
108. Michael J. Gerhardt, Toward a Comprehensive Understanding of the
Federal Appointments Process, 21 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLY 467, 477 (1998); id.
at 478 ("The Clause's allocation of authority means that that [sic] both the
president and the Senate will be involved with a wide variety of appoint-
ments.").
109. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per curiam).
110. See infra Part III (discussing the distinction between principal and
inferior officers).
111. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, c. 2.
112. See U.S. SENATE, COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 106TH CONG.
POLICY AND SUPPORTING POSITIONS (2000), available at www.opm.gov/ plum-
book/. Including judges and military officers, there are more than 3000 offices
that are subject to Senate confirmation. See Gerhardt, supra note 108, at 478.
113. Gerhardt, supra note 108, at 481 (footnote omitted). The Senate,
through its role in the confirmation process and the invocation of senatorial
courtesy, discussed infra Part II.B, also seeks to influence the operation and
administration of the executive branch. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Putting
Presidential Performance in the Federal Appointments Process in Perspective,
47 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 1359, 1366 (1997) ("The more offices requiring con-
firmation created by Congress the more chances Senators have had to consult
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To provide context for understanding the processes govern-
ing the appointment of U.S. Attorneys, this Part discusses the
original intent and historical operation of the Appointments
Clause. This Part concludes by describing the procedures util-
ized to appoint U.S. Attorneys: presidential appointment with
Senate confirmation, appointment by the Attorney General,
and appointment by the local district court. This history, and
the processes utilized for appointing U.S. Attorneys, provides
the basis for analyzing the current appointment regime.
A. THE STRUCTURAL AND POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE
APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE
Although the Framers considered several alternative
methods, the Appointments Clause as ratified represented
their best attempt to use the checks and balances of the consti-
tutional structure to ensure "a higher quality of appoint-
ments."114 The Framers created a national government that
would exercise significant jurisdiction and authority under the
leadership of a single President.'15 The power to appoint those
officers who would administer this government on a day-to-day
with the President in filling those positions and thus the more bargaining
chips Senators have had available to use in dealing with the President on ap-
pointments and related legislative matters.").
114. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 659 (1997). Professor
Gerhardt argues that the process was not designed to ensure the highest qual-
ity of appointments, but rather to reduce the likelihood of particularly inap-
propriate appointments. Gerhardt, supra note 108, at 474.
115. Many legal scholars have endeavored to divine the extent to which the
Framers intended to create a "unitary" executive, and what implications this
has on the separation-of-powers issues generally and the appropriateness of
particular limits on presidential appointment and removal authority. See, e.g.,
Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary
Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1992) (making the case
for a unitary executive); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 27 (responding to Pro-
fessors Calabresi and Rhodes and arguing that the Constitution is ambiguous
with respect to how much authority is vested in the President); see also
Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 23 (responding to Professors Lessig & Sun-
stein).
Even a narrow reading of the executive authority probably must ad-
mit that "[iut is the President's duty to stop his subordinates from executing
the laws oppressively and from using their positions of power to contravene
the law." John R. Martin, Morrison v. Olson and Executive Power, 4 TEX. REV.
L. & POL. 511, 520 (2000); see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 ("[The President] shall
take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed ..... ). This academic debate,
consequential as it is in other contexts, is not germane to this Article, which
takes the office of the U.S. Attorney as it is found-ensconced within the ex-
ecutive branch in the Department of Justice.
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basis was, therefore, of some consequence. Some were con-
cerned that presidential authority would be too monarchical-
and hence, too despotic-if the President were granted sole au-
thority to appoint all officials within the executive branch.'
1 6
Others worried that legislative appointments would arise from
raw political patronage, without due regard for the national
perspective.117
Ultimately, a compromise was reached and the power was
divided: The President and the Senate would be forced to work
together on appointments.' 18 After twice considering and re-
jecting presidential nomination with Senate confirmation, the
delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1787, on the third
vote, adopted the eventual structure of the Appointments
Clause.119
Through the power to nominate, the President was given
primary authority to select officials. 120 By requiring the Presi-
116. See Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 883 (1991) ("The 'manipu-
lation of official appointments' had long been one of the American revolution-
ary generation's greatest grievances against executive power because 'the
power of appointment to offices' was deemed 'the most insidious and powerful
weapon of eighteenth century despotism.'" (quoting GORDON S. WOOD, THE
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 79, 143 (1969))).
117. See JOSEPH P. HARRIS, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE 6
(1953) (discussing the debate over the Appointments Clause at the Constitu-
tional Convention of 1787 ("The evils of legislative appointment of public offi-
cers were well known to members of the Constitutional Convention of 1787,
who frequently referred to the intrigue, caballing, and irresponsibility which
had marked the selection of officers by the state legislatures.")); see also Theo-
dore Y. Blumoff, Separation of Powers and the Origins of the Appointments
Clause, 37 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1037, 1061-70 (1987) (describing debates on the
Appointments Clause at the Constitutional Convention of 1787).
118. See Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 182 (1995) ("The [Appoint-
ments] Clause is a bulwark against one branch aggrandizing its power at the
expense of another branch ....").
119. See William G. Ross, The Senate's Constitutional Role in Confirming
Cabinet Nominees and Other Executive Officers, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1123,
1130-31 (1998).
120. It was by no means inevitable that the chief executive would be
granted primary authority for nominating officers. The tradition of executive
appointment was a vestige of royal prerogative, one that had raised the ire of
the pre-Revolutionary War colonists. See THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE para. 12 (U.S. 1776) ("He [King George III of England] has
erected a multitude of New Offices, and sent hither swarms of Officers to har-
ass our People, and eat out their substance."). In the words of one commenta-
tor,
The [F]ramers came to Philadelphia mindful of the colonial legacy of
monarchical appointment abuses, yet equally fearful of legislative
tyranny. Unlike their commitment to functional divisions of govern-
ment, a bicameral legislature and judicial tenure and salary protec-
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dent alone to take responsibility for nominating the principal
officers of the administration, the Appointments Clause "pre-
serves.., the Constitution's structural integrity by preventing
the diffusion of the appointment power."121 "The Framers an-
ticipated that the President would be less vulnerable to inter-
est-group pressure and personal favoritism than would a collec-
tive body. 'The sole and undivided responsibility of one man
will naturally beget a livelier sense of duty, and a more exact
regard to reputation.' ' 122
At the Constitutional Convention, some argued that nomi-
nation was tantamount to appointment. 123 Thus, to check this
executive authority, the Senate was granted the power to block
the President's nominees. 124 It was argued that the Senate's
role was nothing more than a salutary check on the power of
tions... neither political theory nor history spoke with even a modi-
cum of clarity about the appointment prerogative's proper locus.
Blumoff, supra note 117, at 1069. On the one hand, the power to appoint was
moqt commonly assigned to the executive in colonial governments, with vary-
ing degrees of legislative oversight. See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 81, at 68 (Ronald D. Rotunda &
John E. Nowack eds., 1987) (1833) (discussing appointment practices in the
colonial governments ("The governors also had power, with advice of council,
to establish courts, and to appoint judges and other magistrates, and officers
for the province .... Under this form of government the provinces of New-
Hampshire, New-York, New-Jersey, Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia,
were governed....")). In Massachusetts, the royally appointed governor had
the "right of nominating and with the advice of the council [also appointed by
the crown] of appointing all... sheriffs, provosts, marshals, and justices of the
peace, and other officers of [the] courts of justice." Id. § 27, at 25. On the
other hand, some colonial governments had experimented with legislative ap-
pointment of executive-branch officers. The 1701 Charter of Pennsylvania
provided for an annual assembly of delegates from each county "to have the
usual legislative authority of other colonial assemblies, and also power to
nominate certain persons for office to the governor." Id. § 57, at 53; see also
Casper, supra note 27, at 217 (discussing the original appointment practices
utilized in the newly constituted state governments ("[S]tates distributed the
power of appointments in various ways, but legislative controls predomi-
nated.")).
121. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 878.
122. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 659 (1997) (quoting THE
FEDERALIST NO. 76 (Alexander Hamilton)).
123. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, at 456-57 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961) ("[Elvery advantage to be expected from such an arrange-
ment would, in substance, be derived from the power of nomination ....
There can, in this view, be no difference between nominating and appoint-
ing.").
124. See Harold J. Krent, Separating the Strands in Separation of Powers
Controversies, 74 VA. L. REV. 1253, 1269 (1988) (citing THE FEDERALIST No.
76, at 457 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
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the President: "As the President was to nominate,... there
would be responsibility, and as the Senate was to concur, there
would be security."125 At the ratifying conventions, however,
delegates raised questions about the appointments procedure
and were apprehensive about the Senate's veto prerogative.
They objected that allowing the legislative branch to intrude on
this executive function would make the Senate too powerful
and would eventually allow the Senate to dominate the process.
Addressing the North Carolina ratifying convention, Samuel
Spencer warned,
The President may nominate, but they [the Senate] have a negative
on his nomination, till he has exhausted the number of those he
wishes to be appointed. He will be obliged, finally, to acquiesce in the
appointment of those whom the Senate shall nominate, or else no ap-
pointment will take place.
126
The structure of the Appointments Clause is intended to
protect the branches from one another, but also to provide for
accountability to the public at large. 127 In the eyes of the
Framers, accountability in the appointments process was as
significant as accountability in any aspect of governmental op-
erations. 128 By dividing the responsibility for appointments,
the Framers intended to divide not only the spoils, but the po-
litical ramifications as well:
125. HARRIS, supra note 117, at 24 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Gouverneur Morris in THE DEBATES OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787, REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON 529 (Gaillard Hunt and James Scott
Brown eds., 1920)).
126. HARRIS, supra note 117, at 26 (alteration in original) (citing
JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION IV at 116-18 (1888)). John
Adams also criticized the Senate's role. Writing to Roger Sherman, Adams
worried that granting the power to "advise and consent" to the Senate would
cede an unacceptable influence over the administration of the executive
branch:
[The Senate's role] will weaken the hands of the Executive.... Offi-
cers of the Government, instead of having a single eye and undivided
attachment to the Executive branch, as they ought to have, consistent
with law and the constitution, will be constantly tempted to be fac-
tious with their factious patrons in the Senate. The President's own
officers, in a thousand instances, will oppose his just and constitu-
tional exertions, and screen themselves under the wings of their pa-
trons in the Senate.
Id. at 30 (quoting Letter from John Adams to Roger Sherman, in 4 THE
WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 427-42 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1852-65)).
127. See HARRIS, supra note 117, at 376 ("If one principle in regard to ap-
pointments was prized above others by the [Framers of the Constitution, it
was that of establishing definite responsibility.").
128. See Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 884(1991).
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In the Framers' thinking, the process on which they settled for se-
lecting principal officers would ensure 'judicious" appointments not
only by empowering the President and the Senate to check each other,
but also by allowing the public to hold the President and Senators ac-
countable for injudicious appointments....
"[Tihe blame of a bad nomination would fall upon the president
singly and absolutely. The censure of rejecting a good one would lie
entirely at the door of the senate .... ,129
By generating "conflicts, confusion, and discordance" on "great
issues affecting the people," the Framers hoped to engage the
citizenry in the important decisions of their national leaders. 130
Practices that evade the structural safeguards of the Appoint-
ments Clause deprive "the public of any realistic ability to hold
easily identifiable elected officials to account for bad appoint-
ments."131 As a consequence, "Neither Congress nor the Execu-
tive can agree to waive th[e] structural protection[s]" provided
therein. 132
Although this shared responsibility makes the process less
efficient, it has been noted that "[c]onvenience and efficiency
are not the primary objectives--or the hallmarks--of democ-
ratic government." 133 Moreover, the Senate was expected to ac-
quiesce in the majority of presidential appointments. 134 Be-
cause the President controls the nomination, and ostensibly,
the selection process, the Senate, structurally, is relegated to
exercising a veto.135 The procedure, therefore, places a "politi-
129. Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 186 (1994) (Souter, J., concur-
ring) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 77 (Alexander Hamilton)).
130. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722 (1986). But cf. Angela J. Davis,
The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of Tyranny, 86
IOWA L. REV. 393, 442-43 (2001) (questioning the effectiveness of the Ap-
pointments Clause in increasing accountability in the appointment or per-
formance of U.S. Attorneys).
131. Weiss, 510 U.S. at 191 (Souter, J., concurring).
132. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 880; see also Weiss, 510 U.S. at 188 (Souter, J.,
concurring) ("N~o branch may abdicate its Appointments Clause duties.").
133. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983).
134. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 456-57 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (describing the President's power to nominate as
tantamount to power to appoint).
135. Gerhardt, supra note 108, at 480. The Senate "has turned down only
105 of the 2.4 million executive appointments that the President has made
during the past two centuries." Ross, supra note 119, at 1127. This figure
does not accurately reflect the interplay between the President and the Sen-
ate, however, because many candidates are not nominated after Senators in-
formally articulate their misgivings, and many more nominees are withdrawn
when it is clear they will not be confirmed. Moreover, while the structure
gives the President an advantage in naming officers to the federal government
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cal burden on the Senate [that] makes it difficult [for the Sen-
ate] to successfully oppose a President of ordinary political
strength for narrow or partisan reasons." 136 This forces Senate
deliberations to focus on factors that could disqualify the nomi-
nee, rather than conducting an independent evaluation of the
President's selection. 137 Nonetheless, subjecting appointments
to a political process increases the public's ability to evaluate
the judgment and temperament of their elected officials and to
call them to account if necessary. 138
B. ACCOUNTABILITY IN PRACTICE: SENATORIAL COURTESY
In hindsight, it appears that, as the opponents claimed,
the Senate has been able to assert an overriding influence pur-
suant to its right to "advise and consent." A mere recitation of
the Appointments Clause does not reveal the political gloss it
in Washington, D.C., the tradition of senatorial courtesy, discussed infra Part
II.B, grants the Senate a more prominent role with respect to state-based field
officers of the federal government (such as U.S. Attorneys).
136. John 0. McGinnis, The President, the Senate, the Constitution, and the
Confirmation Process: A Reply to Professors Strauss and Sunstein, 71 TEX. L.
REV. 633, 653 (1993) (alteration in original).
137. STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP THE
FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 159 (1994) (identifying the Senate's focus
on disqualifying factors as a problem). But cf. Gerhardt, supra note 108, at
480 n.26 ("Though Professor Carter does not acknowledge it, this focus is a
product of the constitutional design of the process.").
138. Confirmation battles have, at various times, engaged the public's in-
terest and exposed politicians to opprobrium and eventual electoral defeat for
taking positions unacceptable to their constituents. See Gerhardt, supra note
108, at 489-91. The most striking contemporary example was the confirma-
tion battle that culminated in Justice Thomas's elevation to the Supreme
Court. See JANE MAYER & JILL ABRAMSON, STRANGE JUSTICE: THE SELLING
OF CLARENCE THOMAS 352-54 (1994) (describing the repercussions of the Sen-
ate's bitter confirmation battle over Clarence Thomas and stating that over a
year after Justice Thomas's confirmation Senators "continued to feel the wrath
of dissatisfied voters"). The confirmation hearings were credited with focusing
national attention on sexual harassment and with exposing several Senators
to reproach. See Ronald Dworkin, One Year Later, the Debate Goes On, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 25, 1992, § 7 (Book Review), at 33 (commenting that the hearings
"taught us much about the character of some of our most prominent officials");
see also Gerhardt, supra note 113, at 1372-73 (discussing the character-
revealing nature of confirmation battles).
It must be remembered, however, that confirmation hearings are a
fairly recent invention and that the Senate did not always conduct its business
as publicly as today. See infra note 139. Given the popular election of the
Senators and the prominence that confirmation battles have come to enjoy, the
nomination and confirmation procedure can be characterized as providing not
only structural but also political accountability to the appointments process.
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has acquired through the tradition of senatorial courtesy.139
Since the earliest days of the Republic, Senators have insisted
on playing an active role in the selection of executive-branch of-
ficials for their respective states.140 Where the Senators belong
to the President's political party, "Nominations to federal of-
fices situated within a state have long since come to be looked
139. An accurate understanding of the intent underlying the Appointments
Clause and its reliance on the Senate needs to be informed by an understand-
ing of the original composition of the Senate. Under the original constitutional
structure, Senators, in addition to serving six-year terms, were selected by the
state legislatures. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 (requiring two Senators from each
state to be "chosen by the Legislature thereof), amended by U.S. CONST.
amend. XVII. These features were supposed to bestow a high-minded, judi-
cious, and deliberative nature on the Senate and an appropriate temperament
for working with the executive to ensure competent appointments. See
Gerhardt, supra note 108, at 476.
Whatever validity this presumption enjoyed in 1789, the ratification of
the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, which calls for the popular election of
Senators, altered this original dynamic and has transformed the Senate into a
much more democratically accountable institution. See U.S. CONST. amend.
XVII ("The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators
from each State, elected by the people thereof .... ."). Indeed, until 1929 the
Senate operated under the rule that it met in closed executive session, includ-
ing confirmation proceedings. See HARRIS, supra note 117, at 249-55. Nomi-
nees, even to the judiciary, were never requested to appear before the Senate
(or any of its committees) before 1925. See id. at 117-18; Gerhardt, supra note
108, at 491. The practice of requesting that nominees to the Supreme Court
appear before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary to answer questions
dates only to the mid-1950s when Southern Senators, disturbed by the Su-
preme Court's Equal Protection jurisprudence, demanded that John Harlan
appear before them in 1955 to answer questions about his views on desegrega-
tion. Gerhardt, supra note 108, at 491. Every nominee to the Supreme Court
since has appeared to answer questions from Senators. Id. Confirmation
hearings have become public spectacles and the Senators are "subject to popu-
lar review, comment, and reprisal" for their performance in the appointments
arena. Id. at 489.
140. The Senate insisted on such deference even from President Washing-
ton. HARRIS, supra note 117, at 40-41. President Washington nominated Ben-
jamin Fishbourn to the post of naval officer of the Port of Savannah, Georgia.
Id. at 40. There was no objection to the nominee's fitness to serve in the office,
but the Georgia Senators favored their own candidate. Id. at 40-41. Out of
"courtesy" to their colleagues, the Senators rejected President Washington's
nominee. Id. at 40. Washington acceded and nominated the Georgia Senators'
choice. Id. at 40-41. According to Joseph Harris,
The Fishbourn case initiated the custom which requires the President
to consult with the [Slenators from the state in which a vacancy oc-
curs, and to nominate a person acceptable to them; if he fails to do so,
the Senate as a courtesy to these [Slenators will reject any other
nominee regardless of his qualification.
Id. at 41.
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upon as the perquisite of the [S]enators of that state.1 41 The
tradition of senatorial courtesy obliges the President to consult
with, and in most instances accept, candidates for U.S. Attor-
ney recommended by the Senator(s) of the President's political
party from the state in which a vacancy exists. 142 If there are
no Senators from the President's party in the affected state, the
courtesy is traditionally extended to Representatives of the
President's political party from the state in which the vacancy
occurs. 
14 3
This practice by now is well established and plays an im-
portant role not only in checking executive power, but also in
ensuring that local concerns inform the appointment of federal
field officers. 144 By virtue of their office, Senators are likely to
have a greater understanding of their respective states than
any President. Through their networks and in-state activities,
the Senators are better positioned to canvass the field of able
candidates and assess the desires and tolerances of the com-
munities within their states.145 A Senator's local understand-
ing is particularly relevant to the selection of a U.S. Attorney.
By bringing this political judgment to bear on the selection of
each (federal) district's chief law enforcement officer, senatorial
courtesy helps ensure local acceptance of the exercise of the
prosecutor's authority. It also can ensure that federal officers
141. Id. at 27.
142. See id. at 215-37. This practice has traditionally given Senators a
strong hand in the selection of U.S. Attorneys. Id. For example, Strom Thur-
mond, Jr., twenty-eight years old and just three years out of law school, was
recommended for U.S. Attorney in South Carolina by his father, Strom Thur-
mond. "In a nod to senatorial courtesy on such appointments, [President]
Bush obliged." Robert E. Pierre, In South Carolina, It's All in the Family:
Thurmond Jr. Wins Bipartisan Support for U.S. Attorney Despite Inexperience,
WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 2001, at A5. Professor Meador has commented that the
"selection of U.S. Attorneys may be even more politically charged than selec-
tion of judges; [Slenators may feel more of a patronage claim on U.S. Attor-
neys' positions." MEADOR, supra note 5, at 47; cf Griffin B. Bell & Daniel J.
Meador, Appointing United States Attorneys, 9 J.L. & POL. 247 (1993) (arguing
that the Attorney General should be vested with sole authority to appoint U.S.
Attorneys).
143. See CONGREssIONAL QUARTERLY'S GUIDE TO CONGRESS 282 (5th ed.
2000) (stating that, when neither Senator is from the President's party, the
courtesy is traditionally extended to "party members in the House [of Repre-
sentatives] or to local party officials").
144. See Richman, supra note 79, at 790.
145. At the Constitutional Convention, those in favor of the Senate's role
argued that Senators would be more likely than any single President to know
qualified candidates throughout the country. See 2 MAX FARRAND, supra note
28, at 41, 81.
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are cognizant of local concerns' 46-surely a goal of the Framers.
Of course, there is the potential for pure patronage and crony-
ism to infect this process. 147 Senators who insist on senatorial
prerogative for purely partisan or personal reasons, however,
can be held accountable if their insistence is seen as petty in-
stead of principled. 148
The tradition of senatorial courtesy has been criticized as a
violation of the Framers' original intent.149 In fact, it may work
just as planned: Presidential nomination and Senate confirma-
tion serve several objectives. Accountability is established.
Through the role of the Senators, the primacy of the states is
respected and separation of powers is obeyed, but checks and
balances are included to produce, at least in design, a system
that functions responsibly.
C. THE EXCEPTING CLAUSE
The Constitution requires the President and Congress to
follow the nomination and confirmation procedure for the ap-
pointment of principal officers. An alternative, however, exists
under the Appointments Clause as applied to inferior officers:
"[Tihe Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such in-
ferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in
146. See Richman, supra note 79, at 790 (remarking that senatorial cour-
tesy generally ensures "that U.S. Attorneys have firm roots in the local power
structure and at least appreciate the preferences of the special interests that
dominate it").
147. Harris focuses on the abuse and corrosive effect of the patronage proc-
ess that has characterized senatorial courtesy at different times in our history.
See HARRIS, supra note 117, at 228-31. There is a coordinate concern that
such patronage undermines executive control. See supra note 126.
148. Harris cites several examples of senatorial over-reaching that led to
negative political consequences. HARRIS, supra note 117. One example in-
volved the appointment of a U.S. Attorney. Id. at 88-90. President Cleveland
sought the removal of George Duskin and the appointment of John Burnett to
the position of U.S. Attorney (then still known as district attorney) for Ala-
bama. Id. When the Senate became obstreperous, President Cleveland
mounted a spirited defense of the Presidents' authority to control the service of
executive-branch officers. According to Harris, "The Senate lost prestige in
this contest with the President. Public opinion responded to the vigorous mes-
sage of the President defending the executive power and regarded the contro-
versy as merely a maneuver by Republican [Slenators" to serve partisan inter-
ests. Id. at 90; see also Michael J. Gerhardt, supra note 113, at 1383
("[President Andrew] Jackson decided to use the Senate's blatant partisanship
[in the appointments process] against it in the next presidential election.").
149. See generally HARRIS, supra note 117, at 231-37 (discussing the debate
over whether senatorial courtesy is consistent with the Constitution and the
Framers' original intentions).
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the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments." 150 Known
as the "Excepting Clause," this provision "was added to the
proposed Constitution on the last day of the Grand Convention,
with little discussion."151
If the Appointments Clause strives for accountability, the
Excepting Clause promotes efficiency. The Excepting Clause
protects the effective operation of the federal bureaucracy by
requiring inter-branch cooperation only for truly consequential
positions within the government. By allowing Congress to vest
the authority to appoint "inferior" officers in a single body, the
Framers allowed for administrative convenience and efficiency
in the appointment of subordinate governmental officials. 152
Justice Story commented that, pursuant to the Appointments
Clause,
The president is by law invested, either solely, or with the senate,
with the appointment... of the most important civil officers, and es-
pecially of those connected with the administration of justice, the col-
lection of the revenue, and the supplies and expenditures of the na-
tion. The courts of the Union possess the narrow prerogative of
appointing their own clerk, and reporter, without any farther patron-
age. The heads of department are, in like manner, generally entitled
to the appointment of the clerks in their respective offices. 153
Because of the overriding concern that the national gov-
ernment remain politically accountable, resort to the truncated
process of the Excepting Clause is limited to the appointment of
inferior officers. 154 Accountability is not thereby sacrificed be-
cause the principal officers to whom inferior officers ostensibly
report can be held accountable for an inferior officer's perform-
ance. As a consequence, the distinction between principal and
inferior officers is of great constitutional significance.
D. PROCEDURES FOR APPOINTING U.S. ATTORNEYS
Given the range of discretion exercised by U.S. Attorneys,
150. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
151. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 660 (1997) (citing 2 MAX
FARRAND, supra note 28, at 627-28); see also Akbil Reed Amar, Intratextual-
ism, 112 HARv. L. REV. 747, 808 (1999) (discussing this history and suggesting
that the Excepting Clause "was viewed as a minor housekeeping measure").
As one commentator concluded, "The lack of discussion no doubt reflects the
unspoken consensus that the President (as well as the judiciary, and the heads
of executive departments) must have the authority to hire and fire their own
assistants." Blumoff, supra note 117, at 1069 n.194.
152. See United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 510 (1878).
153. STORY, supra note 120, § 793, at 566-67 (emphasis added).
154. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 660.
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it is no surprise that Congress has sought to retain as great a
role as possible in their selection, and as a corollary, to restrict
the President's discretion as much as possible. 55 Congress has
limited the President's ability to name U.S. Attorneys in two
ways. First, it subjects the President's nominees to confirma-
tion by the Senate, and second, in the absence of a Senate-
approved presidential appointment, Congress vests the power
to name U.S. Attorneys in the district court in the district in
which a vacancy exists.
1. In the Usual Course, U.S. Attorneys are Nominated by the
President and Confirmed by the Senate.
U.S. Attorneys are nominated by the President and con-
firmed by the Senate. 56 Each U.S. Attorney is confirmed for
four years, although the statute allows a Senate-confirmed U.S.
Attorney to remain in office at the expiration of the four-year
term.1 57 Subjecting U.S. Attorneys to the Senate's confirmation
process restricts the President's authority through both formal
and informal means. Formally, the President's nominee is re-
quired to undergo public scrutiny by the Senate. Perhaps of
even greater significance than the public scrutiny endured by
the Senate confirmation are the prerogatives of senatorial cour-
tesy,158 which attach to executive-branch officers, including the
U.S. Attorneys, whose geographic jurisdiction is confined
within one state. For the purposes of this analysis, senatorial
courtesy is significant because it affects the U.S. Attorneys' in-
dependent political base. Although most high executive-branch
officials are handpicked by the cabinet secretary to whom they
report, U.S. Attorneys more likely owe their allegiance to a
Senator and the myriad of local political figures who supported
their nomination, 159 rather than to the Attorney General. This
155. No procedure for appointing U.S. Attorneys (or for that matter, the
Attorney General) was specified in the Judiciary Act of 1789. Nevertheless,
from the outset, the President has nominated individuals to serve as U.S. At-
torneys and submitted the nominations to the Senate for advice and consent.
See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
156. See 28 U.S.C. § 546(a) (1994).
157. See id. § 541(b) (establishing a four-year term but stating that a U.S.
Attorney "shall continue to perform the duties of his [or her] office until his [or
her] successor is appointed and qualifies").
158. See MEADOR, supra note 5, at 47 ("[Slelection of U.S. Attorneys may
be even more politically charged than selection of judges; [S]enators may feel
more of a patronage claim on U.S. Attorneys'positions." (emphasis added)).
159. See Richman, supra note 79, at 785 (noting that in the federal system
397
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process "has long been recognized as a means through which
[S]enators influence prosecutorial behavior in their respective
states."160
2. Filling U.S. Attorney Vacancies
The U.S. Code also provides for the appointment of a U.S.
Attorney when there is a vacancy in the office. The Attorney
General "may appoint a United States [Aittorney for the dis-
trict in which the office of United States [A]ttorney is vacant"
and this appointment is valid until "the expiration of 120 days
after [the] appointment by the Attorney General." 161 If, as is
almost always the case, a Senate-confirmed U.S. Attorney is
not in place at the expiration of 120 days, the authority to ap-
point the U.S. Attorney shifts to the affected district court: "If
an [Attorney General's] appointment expires under subsection
(c)(2), [then] the district court for such district may appoint a
United States [A]ttorney to serve until the vacancy is filled
"prosecutorial discretion is primarily exercised" by U.S. Attorneys, who are
"beholden to legislators, who in turn nurture ties to state and local institu-
tions" (footnote omitted)).
160. Id. at 789. Of course, court-appointed U.S. Attorneys do not necessar-
ily have this political pedigree or support. Court-appointed U.S. Attorneys
rely on, and in turn reflect on, the stature and standing of the district court.
161. 28 U.S.C. § 546(a), (c)(2) (1994). This system was adopted pursuant to
section 69 of the Criminal Law and Procedure Technical Amendments Act of
1986, approved November 10, 1986. Pub. L. No. 99-646, § 69, 100 Stat. 3592,
3616-17 (1986) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 546). Prior to that enactment, the At-
torney General had no authority to appoint a U.S. Attorney in the event of a
vacancy; the district court had sole discretion to appoint a U.S. Attorney when
there was a vacancy. See United States v. Solomon, 216 F. Supp. 835, 836
(S.D.N.Y. 1963) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 506 (1948), 1 ch. 646 § 1, 62 Stat. 909 (codi-
fied as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 546 (1994)); see also United States v. Gantt,
194 F.3d 987, 998 (9th Cir. 1999) (remarking that district courts have "[slince
the Civil War... been empowered to fill vacancies in the office of United
States Attorney"). Whatever the defects of the current system, they are obvi-
ously less offensive than the old one, which denied the executive branch any
formal ability to affect the person appointed as U.S. Attorney in the inevitable
interim between the emergence of a vacancy and the eventual Senate confir-
mation of a presidential nominee. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 673 F.
Supp. 1138, 1142 n.10 (D. Mass. 1987) (remarking that "[t]he 1986 amend-
ments ... would appear to further insulate [the court appointment of U.S. At-
torneys] from constitutional attack").
The only statutory constraint on whom the Attorney General may ap-
point is that, pursuant to subsection (b), "Ithe Attorney General shall not ap-
point as United States [Aittorney a person to whose appointment by the
President to that office the Senate refused to give advice and consent." 28
U.S.C. § 546(b) (1994).
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[through presidential nomination and Senate confirmation]."1 62
The statute does not require the district court to appoint a U.S.
Attorney once the 120-day period has run on the Attorney Gen-
eral's appointment. Instead, the statute provides that the dis-
trict court "may" make its own appointment.
63
In the usual course, very little changes upon the expiration
of the 120-day term of the Attorney General's appointee.164
This is because, as a matter of practice, the Department of Jus-
tice works behind the scenes to affect smooth transitions.
When a vacancy initially arises or is about to arise, where ad-
vance notice has been provided, representatives of the Attorney
General contact the chief judge of the appropriate district court
to explain the provisions dealing with the interim appointment
of the U.S. Attorney. 65 The Department of Justice officials in-
form the chief district court judge166 of the Attorney General's
likely appointee and solicit the judge's reaction.167 The Attor-
162. 28 U.S.C. § 546(d) (1994). Nothing in the statute constrains the dis-
trict court's discretion in who to appoint as the U.S. Attorney.
163. Id.; see also Gantt, 194 F.3d at 1000 ("The judicial branch is not re-
quired to appoint a United States Attorney; it is simply empowered to do so.").
Although the statute does not use that term and there is no limitation on their
authority, U.S. Attorneys who are appointed pursuant to this process are re-
ferred to as "interim" U.S. Attorneys. See United States v. Hilario, 218 F.3d
19, 24 (1st Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 572 (2000). There is no specific
limit on the duration of an "interim" U.S. Attorney's tenure, other than the
nomination by the President and confirmation by the Senate of another U.S.
Attorney. See id. at 23; Tom Rickhoff, The U.S. Attorney: Fateful Powers Lim-
ited, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J. 499, 500 (1997) (remarking that the Western District
of Texas "languished without a presidentially-appointed leader since the
Branch Davidian nightmare" from 1992 through 1997).
The statute does not address the scenario where an Attorney General-
appointed U.S. Attorney's 120-day tenure has expired, but the district court
has not exercised its discretionary authority to appoint a U.S. Attorney. The
district court in Massachusetts upheld the authority of the Attorney General
to appoint an "acting" U.S. Attorney after the expiration of an "interim" U.S.
Attorney's 120-day appointment. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 673 F.
Supp. 1138, 1142-43 (D. Mass. 1987).
164. See Interview with David Margolis and Bernie Delia, Associate Dep-
uty Attorneys General, in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 28, 2000) (on file with au-
thor) (characterizing the process utilized by the Department of Justice in ad-
ministering 28 U.S.C. § 546(c)-(d)).
165. See id.
166. The statute confers authority on "the district court." 28 U.S.C.
§ 546(d) (1994). How the various district courts exercise this authority (i.e.,
through consensus, committee, or delegation exclusively to the chiefjudge) is a
matter of internal court policy and is not a matter of public record.
167. See Interview with David Margolis and Bernie Delia, Associate Dep-
uty Attorneys General, in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 28, 2000) (on file with au-
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ney General almost always selects a career Assistant U.S. At-
torney from the district in which the vacancy arises. Some-
times, though infrequently, the Attorney General selects a ca-
reer prosecutor from Main Justice.1 68  By keeping the chief
district court judge "in the loop" during the Attorney General's
selection process and by choosing, in most instances, a career
prosecutor with whom the judge is familiar, the Attorney Gen-
eral can reasonably expect that her appointee will continue to
serve as U.S. Attorney at the expiration of the 120 days.
169
This may occur either through subsequent court appointment
of the same individual or through court inaction that leaves the
Attorney General's appointee, albeit precariously, in place. 170
Near the expiration of the Attorney General's appointee's 120-
day tenure, representatives of the Attorney General send a let-
ter to the chief district judge reminding the judge of the court's
authority to appoint a U.S. Attorney.17 1 The letter also includes
a proposed court order reappointing the Attorney General's ap-
pointee. 172 This informal contact (i.e., outside the context of a
thor).
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. See id. Although the practice of including the district judge from the
outset has been relatively successful at ensuring that the Attorney General's
nominee is accepted by the district court, it has not been foolproof. For exam-
ple, during Attorney General Janet Reno's tenure, two separate district courts
each replaced the Attorney General's appointee with a U.S. Attorney of its own
choosing. The two appointments that departed from the Attorney General's
120-day appointee occurred in Puerto Rico and in one district within the con-
tinental United States.
In Puerto Rico, a vacancy occurred in the office of the U.S. Attorney in
May 1993. See United States v. Hilario, 218 F.3d 19, 21 (1st Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 121 S. Ct. 572 (2000). The Attorney General appointed Charles Fitz-
williams to fill the vacancy. Id.
Because the President failed to name a replacement within 120 days,
Fitzwilliams' appointment lapsed and the position once again became
vacant. On September 9, 1993, the judges of the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Puerto Rico responded to the exigency
and appointed a career Justice Department lawyer, Guillermo Gil, as
interim United States Attorney.
Id. (citation omitted). President Clinton never nominated a U.S. Attorney for
the District of Puerto Rico; Gil served as the district court's appointee as U.S.
Attorney for more than seven years. See United States v. Sotomayor-Vazquez,
249 F.3d 1, 20 (1st Cir. 2001).
In the other instance, according to Associate Deputy Attorneys Gen-
eral David Margolis and Bernie Delia, a Senate-confirmed U.S. Attorney died
in office. See Interview with David Margolis and Bernie Delia, Associate Dep-
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particular case and lacking the public character of a motion or
other court filing) between federal prosecutors and sitting fed-
eral judges raises questions about the appropriate role of
judges in decisions otherwise reserved to politically accountable
actors. 1
73
Furthermore, ambiguity exists concerning the Attorney
General's appointment authority when no U.S. Attorney has
been confirmed by the Senate at the expiration of the 120-day
limit imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 546(c). Because the statute limits
the Attorney General-appointed U.S. Attorney's term to 120
days, the position is legally "vacant" after the 120 days have
expired. 174 The plain language of the statute appears to vest
the Attorney General with the authority to appoint another
U.S. Attorney. 7 5 The paltry legislative history on § 546, how-
ever, implies that such a subsequent appointment by the At-
uty Attorneys General, in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 28, 2000) (on file with au-
thor). The Attorney General chose an interim U.S. Attorney who served for
120 days. Id. At the expiration of the 120-day term, the district court refused
to reappoint the Attorney General's appointee, instead choosing its own U.S.
Attorney. Id. The court-appointed U.S. Attorney served in that capacity for
over two years. Id.
The courts took these actions without explanation. Perhaps the courts
should be required to make their appointment process more transparent.
There is no accepted method for inquiring into judges' motives and procedures
for making particular decisions, however, and if such inquiries were issued,
there would be little incentive for the judges to respond (unlike politically ac-
countable actors). This illustrates one of the problems with the court ap-
pointment of U.S. Attorneys: It shields an inherently political process from
public scrutiny.
173. See, e.g., SEYIIOUR, supra note 43, at 50 (remarking that, while main-
taining good relations with the local federal judges is an important responsi-
bility of the U.S. Attorney, it "is a delicate balancing act, for the United States
Attorney is a litigant who may not engage in ex parte, or private, commiunica-
tion with the judge").
174. See In re Farrow, 3 F. 112, 115-17 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1880) (recognizing
the President's authority to make a recess appointment even where the court
had named a U.S. Attorney to fill the vacancy because the position remained
legally "vacant"); Staebler v. Carter, 464 F. Supp. 585, 594 (D.D.C. 1979); see
also Memorandum from Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, Office of Legal Counsel, to William P. Tyson, Director, Executive Office
for United States Attorneys 3 (Nov. 13, 1986) [hereinafter Alito Memorandum]
(on fie with author) (concluding that a vacancy exists in the office of U.S. At-
torney at the expiration of the 120-day period defined in 28 U.S.C. § 546(c)).
175. See 28 U.S.C. § 546(a) (1994) ("[The Attorney General may appoint a
United States [Aittorney for the district in which the office of United States
[Aittorney is vacant."); see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 673 F. Supp.
1138, 1142 n.11 (D. Mass. 1987) (recognizing that "it is not clear from this
Court's reading of the statute, that the Attorney General himself would be
foreclosed from making a second interim appointment").
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torney General was not what Congress intended. As Con-
gressman Berman stated on the floor of the House of Represen-
tatives, "Once the appointment of an interim United States At-
torney expires, the district court appoints a United States
Attorney to serve until a presidentially appointed United
States Attorney is qualified." 176 As such, while the statute en-
visions the court-appointed prosecutor serving "until a presi-
dentially appointed United States Attorney is qualified,"177 it
does not address the situation where the office becomes vacant
after a court-appointed U.S. Attorney leaves or is removed by
the President before a presidentially nominated U.S. Attorney
has been confirmed by the Senate.
The Justice Department has taken the position that a sec-
ond appointment by the Attorney General would be inappropri-
ate because "[t]he statutory plan discloses a [c]ongressional
purpose that after the expiration of the 120-day period further
interim appointments are to be made by the court rather than
by the Attorney General." 178 This interpretation suggests that
after an initial 120-day appointment, appointments to the U.S.
Attorney position must come either from the district court or
from the President with the Senate's approval. Even where the
district court-appointed U.S. Attorney serves for several years
before that office becomes vacant again, the Attorney General
is apparently without authority to appoint a replacement. In a
later interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 546(c), however, the Depart-
ment of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel argued that, if the
President removed a court-appointed U.S. Attorney, then the
Attorney General would have the power to appoint another
U.S. Attorney. 179 The Office of Legal Counsel noted the De-
176. 132 CONG. REC. 32707, 32806 (statement of Rep. Berman).
177. Id.
178. Alito Memorandum, supra note 174, at 3 (citing legislative history);
see also 17 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 1, 1-5 (1993) (contrasting Attorney Gen-
eral's statutory authority to fill U.S. Marshal vacancies which reserves no role
for courts and citing Alito Memorandum, supra note 174).
179. See Memorandum from Charles J. Cooper, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, Office of Legal Counsel, to Arnold I. Burns, Deputy Attorney General 1
(Apr. 15, 1987) [hereinafter Cooper Memorandum] (on file with author). Ac-
cording to the Office of Legal Counsel,
It could be argued that, after the removal by the President of a court
appointed United States Attorney, the power to appoint an interim
United States Attorney shifts back to the Attorney General, because
the court's power of appointment is conditioned on the expiration of a
120-day appointment by the Attorney General.
402 [Vol. 86:363
2001] COURT APPOINTMENT OF U.S. ATTORNEYS 403
partment of Justice Criminal Division's disagreement with this
interpretation. 180 These competing interpretations have never
been reconciled because this authority has apparently never
been tested. 181
Given the legal definition of "vacancy," it is unclear why the Attorney
General would need to wait for the President to remove the court-appointed
U.S. Attorney. See Farrow, 3 F. at 115-17.
180. Cooper Memorandum, supra note 179, at 1.
181. If the current, court-appointment system is deemed to be constitu-
tional and is retained, Congress should at least clarify its intended operation.
See United States v. Hilario, 218 F.3d 19, 24 (1st Cir. 2000) ("If we were writ-
ing on a pristine page and wished to devise a template for the appointment of
United States Attorneys, we might design it differently."), cert. denied, 121 S.
Ct. 572 (2000). First, Congress should direct the district courts to appoint in-
terim U.S. Attorneys under 28 U.S.C. § 546(d). The permissive "may" should
be replaced with "shall," so that the statute would read as follows: "If [the At-
torney General's] appointment expires under [the 120-day limit of] subsection
(c)(2), the district court for such district shall appoint a United States
[Aittorney to serve until the vacancy is filled." In at least one instance, the
judiciary has refused (or at least failed) to exercise its authority to appoint a
U.S. Attorney, allowing the Attorney General to name an "acting" U.S. Attor-
ney after the expiration of a prior 120-day "interim" appointment by the At-
torney General. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 673 F. Supp. 1138, 1138 (D.
Mass. 1987).
The uncertainty that is created by the permissive "may" exacerbates
the statute's ambiguity with respect to the authority of the district court and
the authority of the Attorney General. Therefore, Congress should clarify
whether the Attorney General's authority is limited to one 120-day appoint-
ment. Although the Department of Justice currently interprets the statute in
this way, the statutory language is susceptible to the reasonable interpreta-
tion that the Attorney General can affect successive 120-day appointments,
particularly if the court does not act. Indeed, this construction has been sug-
gested in one published district court opinion, see id., and by an Office of Legal
Counsel interpretive memorandum. See Cooper Memorandum, supra note
179, at 1. If Congress intends to limit the Attorney General to no more than
one 120-day appointment in the interim between presidential appointments
(no matter how long the interim), it should say so unambiguously.
Lastly, Congress should decide whether the office of the U.S. Attorney
is "vacant" when it is occupied by a court-appointed U.S. Attorney. Prior judi-
cial and executive-branch interpretations have reached the conclusion that the
office is indeed vacant during the pendency of a court appointment. See supra
note 174 and accompanying text. Although Congress cannot legislatively alter
the President's constitutional authority to make recess appointments, Con-
gress can determine when that office is legally "vacant," assuming, of course,
that the U.S. Attorney is indeed an inferior officer. This is significant because
if the position of U.S. Attorney is legally "vacant" while a court-appointed in-
cumbent is in office, it could be argued that, under the statute as currently
written, the Attorney General could replace a court-appointed U.S. Attorney
with her own 120-day appointment. Congress ought to make these policy
choices explicitly instead of leaving them open to executive-branch abuse, and
ultimately, judicial branch resolution.
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E. PROCEDURES FOR REMOVING U.S. ATTORNEYS
Only the President may remove a U.S. Attorney.182 This is
true regardless of how the U.S. Attorney was appointed to her
position.183 Consequently, U.S. Attorneys have come to regard
themselves as independent presidential agents. Although the
Attorney General has the legal authority to direct U.S. Attor-
neys and may remove individual cases from a U.S. Attorney's
supervision, the U.S. Attorneys' presidential commissions and
senatorial support allow them to resist effectively the Attorney
General's control.18 4
III. PRINCIPAL VERSUS INFERIOR OFFICERS
Having explained the roles and responsibilities of U.S. At-
torneys and the procedures for their appointment and removal,
the constitutionality of the appointment of U.S. Attorneys by
federal judges can be examined. U.S. Attorneys are, without
any doubt, "officers" as the term is used in the Appointments
Clause of the Constitution.18 5 As the preceding discussion illus-
trates, Congress has chosen to vest the authority to appoint
U.S. Attorneys, under certain circumstances, in the Attorney
General and the district court.186 Because the Appointments
182. See 28 U.S.C. § 541(c) (1994) ("Each United States [A]ttorney is sub-
ject to removal by the President."); Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324
(1897). Of course, U.S. Attorneys can also be removed through the impeach-
ment process. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
183. See United States v. Solomon, 216 F. Supp. 835, 843 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
184. See EISENSTEIN, supra note 6, at 12, 16. The Department of Justice
has sought in recent years to "exercise greater supervisory control over deci-
sion-making by United States [A]ttorneys in the field, with a view to making
federal prosecutive policy more uniform nationwide." Richman, supra note 79,
at 781 (quoting NORMAN ABRAMS & SARA SUN BEALE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL
LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 6 (2d ed. 1993)). Nonetheless, "U.S. [Aittorneys
retain a remarkable degree of power." Id.; see also EISENSTEIN, supra note 6,
at 108 (commenting on the independence of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the
Southern District of New York (Manhattan), which "serves as a constant re-
minder to the department that its field offices can achieve a position of semi-
autonomy... provid[ing] other U.S. [Aittorneys with a model of how much in-
dependence is possible."). Indeed, "because of its legendary independence and
tenacity" the Southern District of New York "is known as the 'sovereign dis-
trict' of New York." Chitra Ragavan, The Pardon Buck Stops Here: U.S. At-
torney Mary Jo White Takes the Lead, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Mar. 26,
2001, at 24.
185. See United States v. Gantt, 194 F.3d 987, 999 (9th Cir. 1999) ("United
States Attorneys are clearly 'officers' of the United States." (citing Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per curiam))).
186. See supra Part II.D.2.
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Clause validates such a delegation only with respect to inferior
officers, the first step in assessing the validity of the court ap-
pointment of U.S. Attorneys requires determining whether U.S.
Attorneys are principal or inferior officers.187
The Supreme Court has had relatively few occasions to de-
fine the difference between principal and inferior officers. Most
decisions have proceeded on an ad hoc analysis and the Su-
preme Court has "not set forth an exclusive criterion for distin-
guishing between principal and inferior officers for Appoint-
ments Clause purposes."188  An analysis of the existing
jurisprudence, however, reveals that U.S. Attorneys should be
considered principal officers.
Two Supreme Court cases decided within ten years of each
other illustrate the ad hoc nature of Appointments Clause ju-
risprudence and offer divergent approaches to distinguishing
between principal and inferior officers. Morrison v. Olson 189
scrutinized the Ethics in Government Act and the office of the
Independent Counsel, which that act created, and concluded
that, for purposes of the Appointments Clause, the Independent
Counsel was an inferior officer. 190 Edmond v. United States,191
employing a different, more formal analytical framework, con-
cluded that judges on the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Ap-
peals were also inferior officers and consequently validated
their appointment by the Secretary of Transportation against
an Appointments Clause challenge. 192 Although both of these
cases resulted in the conclusion that those officers were infe-
rior, their reasoning leads to the conclusion that U.S. Attorneys
187. See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 659-60 (1997) (noting that
the administrative convenience of delegating authority to appoint was
"deemed to outweigh the benefits of the more cumbersome procedure only with
respect to . . . 'inferior Officers"); see also United States v. Hilario, 218 F.3d
19, 24 (1st Cir. 2000) ("[The Clause makes nomination and confirmation the
requisite appointment protocol for what have come to be known as 'principal
officers' of the United States but allows Congress to permit a limited class of
officials to appoint 'inferior officers' without the need for confirmation."), cert.
denied, 121 S. Ct. 572 (2000).
188. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 661; see also STORY, supra note 120, at 566 ("In
the practical course of the government, there does not seem to have been any
exact line drawn, who are, and who are not, to be deemed inferior officers in
the sense of the [Clonstitution, whose appointment does not necessarily re-
quire the concurrence of the [Sienate.").
189. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
190. Id. at 671-73.
191. 520 U.S. 651.
192. Id. at 658-66.
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are principal officers.
A. THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH: MORRISON V. OLSON
The legislation creating the Independent Counsel has been
allowed to expire,193 but the seminal Appointments Clause case
of Morrison v. Olson, which upheld the validity of the appoint-
ment process for the Independent Counsel, sheds important
light on the court appointment of U.S. Attorneys. This is be-
cause the Independent Counsel represents a relevant analogy
to the U.S. Attorney for purposes of an Appointments Clause
analysis. 194
Reacting to the constitutional crisis and drop in public con-
fidence in government occasioned by the Watergate scandal,
Congress passed the Ethics in Government Act in 1978.195 The
Ethics in Government Act was an attempt to remove discretion
over criminal investigations and prosecutions of high-level gov-
ernment officials from the political arena, providing for the ap-
pointment of an Independent Counsel "to investigate and, if
appropriate, prosecute certain high ranking Government offi-
cials for violations of federal criminal laws."196 A "Special Divi-
sion" of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, con-
sisting of three circuit court judges appointed to two-year terms
by the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, was
created to appoint such Independent Counsels. 197
The Ethics in Government Act purported to require the At-
torney General to apply to the Special Division for the ap-
pointment of an Independent Counsel when the Attorney Gen-
eral received information sufficient to warrant a criminal
193. The Independent Counsel Act expired on June 30, 1999. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 599 (1994); see also Suro, supra note 2, at A6.
194. See Donald C. Smaltz, The Independent Counsel: A View From Inside,
86 GEo. L.J. 2307, 2331 (1998) (characterizing the Independent Counsel as
one who "stands in the shoes and is the functional equivalent of a United
States Attorney, albeit with a narrow jurisdictional mandate").
195. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 591-99).
196. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 660 (1988).
197. 28 U.S.C. § 49 (1994). One can question whether the Special Division
actually constituted a "court of law," given that it heard no cases and had no
jurisdiction except to administer the Independent Counsel provisions of the
Act. See id. Although this tangential issue is not implicated when district
courts appoint U.S. Attorneys (for district courts are surely "courts of law"),
the district courts' continued interaction with the U.S. Attorney in the gov-
ernment's cases raises other serious issues. See infra Part IV.
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investigation. 198 Once the Attorney General applied, the Spe-
cial Division was required to appoint an Independent Counsel
to investigate and prosecute suspected criminal activity on the
part of certain high-ranking government officials. 199 The Spe-
cial Division was directed to set the Independent Counsel's ju-
risdiction.200 Within such jurisdiction, the Ethics in Govern-
ment Act granted the Independent Counsel "full power and
independent authority to exercise all investigative and prosecu-
torial functions and powers of the Department of Justice, the
Attorney General, and any other officer or employee of the De-
partment of Justice."201
The Court was understandably eager not to strike down a
cornerstone of the Watergate-era reforms.20 2 Because the In-
dependent Counsel was appointed by the courts of law, how-
ever, the appointment was valid only if the Independent Coun-
sel was an inferior officer.20 3  In determining that the
Independent Counsel "clearly f[ell] on the 'inferior officer' side
of th[e] line," the Court took an entirely functional approach. 2°4
198. See 28 U.S.C. § 592(c)(1)(a) (1994) (requiring the Attorney General to
apply for the appointment of an Independent Counsel if the Attorney General
determines that there are "reasonable grounds to believe that further investi-
gation [or prosecution] is warranted"); see also Morrison, 487 U.S. at 661 (cit-
ing 28 U.S.C. § 592 (1994)).
199. 28 U.S.C. § 593(b)(1) (1994). Instead of appointing a new Independent
Counsel, the Special Division could also add a new matter to the jurisdiction of
an existing Independent Counsel.
200. Id. The Special Division's authority beyond the act of appointing the
Independent Counsel-setting jurisdiction, and eventually, terminating the
office-presented further complications with which Morrison had to grapple.
See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 680-84. The Supreme Court characterized these
powers as "incidental" to the appointment authority. Id. at 679. This deter-
mination is among the holdings in Morrison that have been criticized by
scholars. See, e.g., Krent, supra note 124, at 1321.
This related issue is not presented in the context of 28 U.S.C.
§ 546(d)'s authorization to appoint U.S. Attorneys; the district courts are not
given any responsibilities to set the U.S. Attorneys' jurisdiction or to supervise
their work. See United States v. Hilario, 218 F.3d 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2000) (find-
ing it "significant that section 546(d) neither grants the judges of the district
court authority to supervise or remove an interim United States Attorney
whom they have appointed nor gives them power to determine (or even influ-
ence) how the appointee will enforce the laws"), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 572
(2000).
201. 28 U.S.C § 594 (1994).
202. See In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 517 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (recognizing
that the circumstances leading to the passage of the Act had "divide[d] the na-
tion politically"), rev'd sub nom. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
203. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 670-71.
204. Id. at 671.
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The Court's inquiry centered on Congress's overriding policy in-
terests in passing the Act and balanced these interests against
the Act's interference with the traditional executive-branch hi-
erarchy. Ultimately, the Court found a compelling congres-
sional purpose that justified the intrusion into presidential pre-
rogative.
First, the Court noted that the Independent Counsel was
"subject to removal by a higher Executive Branch official."20 6
Recognizing that the Independent Counsel may not be "subor-
dinate" to the Attorney General "insofar as [the Independent
Counsel] possesses a degree of independent discretion to exer-
cise the powers delegated to her under the Act," the Court still
found significance in the removal authority granted to the At-
torney General. 20 7 Notwithstanding the fact that the statute
restricted the Attorney General's power to remove an Inde-
pendent Counsel only in instances of "good cause,"208 the Court
construed the removal authority as an indication that the In-
dependent Counsel was an inferior officer.20 9
Second, the Court focused on the Independent Counsel's
authority "to perform only certain, limited duties."210 The
Court reasoned that Independent Counsels were inferior-
rather than principal-officers because the Independent Coun-
sel focused only on enumerated, high-ranking government offi-
cials and also because the Independent Counsel was only in-
tended to investigate the alleged commission of certain federal
crimes. 211 In this vein, the Court observed that the Act's broad
grant of prosecutorial authority and discretion, albeit within
certain limited factual contexts, did "not include any authority
to formulate policy for the Government or the Executive
Branch."212 The Court credited the Act with limiting the Inde-
205. Id. at 677 (stating that Congress "was concerned when it created the
office of independent counsel with the conflicts of interest that could arise in
situations when the Executive Branch is called upon to investigate its own
high-ranking officers").
206. Id. at 671.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 663 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1) (1994)).
209. Id. at 671.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. In retrospect, it is clear that the authority to litigate without su-
pervision carried with it the ability to establish policy. In the course of the
Whitewater investigation and ensuing prosecutions, the Whitewater Inde-
pendent Counsel challenged executive-branch assertions of executive privilege
408 [Vol. 86:363
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pendent Counsel's discretion to set policy by "specifically
provid[ing] that in policy matters [the Independent Counsel] is
to comply to the extent possible with the policies of the Depart-
ment [of Justice]. ' 213
Third, the Court emphasized that the Independent Coun-
sel's office was one of limited jurisdiction. 214 The initial ap-
pointment of any Independent Counsel was triggered exclu-
sively by the Attorney General's formal application to the
Special Division on suspicion of certain, serious criminal activ-
ity.215 The Attorney General's decision not to apply for the ap-
pointment of an Independent Counsel was not reviewable. 216
Furthermore, an Independent Counsel was only authorized to
"act within the scope of the jurisdiction ... granted by the Spe-
cial Division pursuant to a request by the Attorney General."217
The Court neglected to mention that the Independent Counsel's
jurisdiction could be expanded, either upon motion by the At-
torney General or through a broad interpretation of the original
jurisdictional grant.218
and consequently affected executive-branch policy, and policy-making ability,
in this area. See In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam)
(refusing to extend the protection of the government attorney-client privilege
to communications between the President, the Presidenes personal counsel,
and Deputy White House Counsel, and requiring Deputy White House Coun-
sel to testify in front of a grand jury regarding the content of such communica-
tions), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 996 (1998); In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073,
1077 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (dismissing the Clinton Administration's
claim of national security concerns as "speculative" and ordering secret service
agents to testify about presidential actions over the President's objections),
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 990 (1998); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum,
112 F.3d 910, 922-24 (8th Cir. 1997) (refusing to extend the attorney-client
privilege to communications between White House lawyers, the First Lady,
and her private attorney, and allowing the Independent Counsel to inquire
into such communications), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1105 (1997). For a critique
of these cases' narrow interpretation of executive privilege, see Akhil Reed
Amar, Nixon's Shadow, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1405, 1417-18 (1999).
213. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 672 (emphasis added) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 594(f)
(1994)). But cf. id. at 707 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing this limitation as
"an empty promise").
214. Id. at 672.
215. See 28 U.S.C. § 592(c) (1994).
216. See id. § 592(b)(1), (W.
217. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 672.
218. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 593(c)(2), 594(e). Although the Special Division was
not authorized to expand the Independent Counsel's jurisdiction -without a re-
quest from the Attorney General, the Special Division was authorized to refer
"related" cases to the Independent Counsel and could construe the original ju-
risdictional grant broadly so as to nullify this limitation. See In re Madison
Guar. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 1994 WL 913274 at *-1 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 5, 1994)
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Fourth, the Court noted that each particular Independent
Counsel was 'limited in tenure."219 Despite acknowledging that
there was no particular time limit associated with the service of
an Independent Counsel, the Court nonetheless found it sig-
nificant that the Independent Counsel was "appointed essen-
tially to accomplish a single task, and when that task [was]
over the office [was] terminated, either by the counsel herself or
by action of the Special Division."220 "Unlike other prosecutors,
[the Independent Counsel had] no ongoing responsibilities...
beyond the accomplishment of the mission that [it] was ap-
pointed for and authorized by the Special Division to under-
take."2 21
Finally, the Court noted that such a conclusion was "con-
sistent with [its] few previous decisions that considered the
question whether a particular Government official is a 'princi-
pal' or an 'inferior' officer."222 Indeed, the Court does not ap-
pear to have had occasion to conclude that any executive-
branch official represented a principal officer.
It is difficult to extend the Morrison holding beyond its
specific context; the opinion does not establish bright lines or
generally applicable rules and appears to rely largely on theimmediate historic and political context in which the Ethics in
Government Act arose. Indeed, despite the constitutional sig-
nificance of this determination, the entire analysis concluding
that Independent Counsels were inferior officers takes up less
than three pages in the United States Reports.223 Notwith-
standing the criticism engendered by the Morrison decision, it
(granting the Independent Counsel's Office jurisdiction and authority to inves-
tigate other allegations "related" to the Whitewater matter); In re Sealed Case,
838 F.2d 476, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (describing the Special Division's formal
refusal to expand the Independent Counsel's jurisdiction but concurrently
finding the requested jurisdiction "implicit" in the original jurisdictional
grant), rev'd sub nom. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); see also In re
Espy, 80 F.3d 501, 508-09 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (ordering the referral
of matters that arose out of and were connected with the Independent Coun-
sel's original investigation to the Independent Counsel).
219. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 672.
220. Id.
221. Id. (emphasis added).
222. Id. (discussing previous decisions including United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683, 694, 696 (1974) (referring to Watergate Special Prosecutor as a
"subordinate officer")); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344,
352-53 (1931) (stating that "United States Commissioners are inferior offi-
cers."); and Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397-99 (1879) (holding that super-
visors of elections were inferior officers)).
223. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671-73.
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is a seminal interpretation of the Appointments Clause, and in
particular, the distinction between principal and inferior prose-
cutorial officers. Moreover, even though Congress has allowed
the Ethics in Government Act to expire, Morrison, ostensibly,
remains good law. As such, its analysis must inform this dis-
cussion.
Application of Morrison leads to the conclusion that the
U.S. Attorney does not qualify as an inferior officer. A U.S. At-
torney is not removable by a higher executive-branch official,
except by the President.224 It always has been presumed, how-
ever, that the President must retain the ability to remove
purely executive principal officers at will. 225 Consequently, re-
quiring presidential action to remove a U.S. Attorney can
hardly be considered an indication of inferior officer status.
Prior to Morrison, the ability to remove any officers whose du-
ties significantly implicated the President's ability to achieve
policy goals was viewed as a necessary corollary of the Presi-
dent's responsibility and authority to execute the laws. 226 Mor-
rison signaled a dramatic jurisprudential shift in this regard.
The case did not, however, disturb the understanding that
principal officers serve at the pleasure of the President because
the Court concluded that Independent Counsels were inferior
officers.227 The U.S. Attorney, it should be noted, presents a
different scenario on removability. Whereas the Attorney Gen-
eral could remove the Independent Counsel for cause,22 8 the At-
torney General has no authority to remove a U.S. Attorney;22 9
and whereas the President had no authority to remove an In-
dependent Counsel,23 0 the President has unlimited discretion to
remove a U.S. Attorney. 231 The Attorney General's discretion
224. 28 U.S.C. § 546(c) (1994).
225. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926); see also Hum-
phrey's E-'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627-28 (1935) (interpreting Myers
to stand for the proposition that the President has "illimitable power of re-
moval" over purely executive officers). But see Morrison, 487 U.S. at 695 (stat-
ing that Congress may limit removal of executive officers if doing so does not
impair the President's ability to accomplish "constitutionally assigned func-
tions"). See generally id. at 724-27 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (analyzing removal
discussions in Myers and Humphrey's Executor).
226. See Meyers, 272 U.S. at 119.
227. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671.
228. Id.
229. See 28 U.S.C. § 541(c) (1994); United States v. Hilario, 218 F.3d 19, 27
(1st Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 572 (2000).
230. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 663, 671.
231. See 28 U.S.C. § 541(c) (1994); 3 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 448, 448-50
411
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to remove the U.S. Attorney from any particular case or matter
may be interpreted as indicative of inferior-officer status. The
fact that U.S. Attorneys are removable solely by the President,
and by no other executive-branch official, however, serves as a
powerful indication of principal-officer status. Thus, Morrison's
removability factor is not determinative of the U.S. Attorneys'
status.
By turning to the other Morrison factors, U.S. Attorneys
can be distinguished from Independent Counsels in critical re-
spects. Instead of performing "certain, limited duties,' 2 32 the
U.S. Attorney is empowered to exercise significant discretion in
both scope and depth. All people within the judicial district,
and with few limited exceptions, all federal laws, fall within the
U.S. Attorneys' jurisdiction. U.S. Attorneys determine which
areas of federal law deserve the greatest allocation of prosecu-
torial resources through everyday decisions and personnel as-
signments. In the case of the Independent Counsel, the politi-
cal branches decided that certain crimes allegedly committed
by specific officials deserved singular attention without regard
to limitations on resources. In contrast, U.S. Attorneys must
consider the entire range of federal law enforcement interests
in light of limited resources and set their agendas accord-
ingly.233 Further, not only must U.S. Attorneys take into ac-
count the possibility of securing a conviction against a particu-
lar defendant when weighing a case and deciding whether to
prosecute, but they must also consider the case's "general de-
terrence value, the Government's enforcement priorities, and
the case's relationship to the Government's overall enforcement
plan."234 One former U.S. Attorney lamented that "[plolicy-
making on the national level is nonexistent in most areas of
criminal justice. Individual United States Attorneys are al-
lowed to set their own enforcement policy in important and
(1979).
232. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671.
233. According to one observer,
"A U.S. Attorney has hundreds of thousands of cases to look at and a
need to make cost judgments about what is worth pursuing.... The
truth is, because of the way the independent counsel statute works,
things a U.S. [Aittorney would never investigate get investigated un-
der this statute because the independent counsel has one [case] and
one case only."
Joseph diGenova, former U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia and for-
mer special counsel, quoted in Susan Page, Are Independent Counsels Out of
Control?, USA TODAY, Nov. 14, 1997, at 2A.
234. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985).
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sensitive fields."12 35 Because U.S. Attorneys decide what posi-
tions to take on unresolved issues in federal law and how such
positions will affect other litigation and other federal interests,
they formulate and execute policy on behalf of the United
States.236 In determining the inferior-officer status of the Inde-
pendent Counsel, the Supreme Court found it significant that
the office of the Independent Counsel was created to focus on
certain limited executive-branch officials who were alleged to
have committed certain serious crimes.237 Because U.S. Attor-
neys exercise jurisdiction over all the people in their districts
and virtually all federal statutes, U.S. Attorneys cannot be de-
scribed as performing "certain limited duties" like the Inde-
pendent Counsel.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a U.S. Attorney is not lim-
ited like that of the Independent Counsel. In contrast to the
discrete jurisdictional grant bestowed upon the Independent
Counsel by the Special Division, U.S. Attorneys "ha[ve] plenary
authority" over all federal criminal and civil matters within
their district.238 Without any supervision, except in very lim-
ited circumstances, U.S. Attorneys are authorized to empanel
grand juries, determine what crimes they will investigate, de-
cide what evidence to present to grand juries, secure and file
indictments, and prosecute individuals for the entire range of
federal crimes. 239
In one respect, the Independent Counsel's jurisdiction
could be considered broader than that of a U.S. Attorney: The
former was vested with total discretion to appeal adverse rul-
ings,24° whereas the latter is constrained in that regard. The
Attorney General has determined that no appeals can be pur-
sued by U.S. Attorneys without the prior approval of the Solici-
tor General. 241 By determining which cases will set the appel-
late precedents that bind entire regions of the country, Main
Justice reserves a powerful policy-setting decision and limits
U.S. Attorneys' discretion. That said, the prosecutorial and
235. SEYMOUR, supra note 43, at 237 (recommending imposition of a higher
degree of uniformity on the discretionary authority exercised by U.S. Attor-
neys).
236. See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 160-61 (1984).
237. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 672.
238. U.S. ATToRNEYs' MANUAL, supra note 6, §§ 4-1.100, 9-2.001.
239. Id. § 9-2.010, 9-2.030.
240. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 662 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 594(a) (1994)).
241. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.20(b) (2000).
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other litigation-related decisions routinely made by U.S. Attor-
neys in the district courts242 indicate their status as principal
officers.
Moreover, a U.S. Attorney's tenure cannot be considered
"temporary" in the sense that the term was used in Morrison.243
Although § 541(b) establishes a four-year "term" for U.S. Attor-
neys, 2 " this temporal limit is illusory as either a positive or
negative limitation on a U.S. Attorney's tenure. The President
may remove a U.S. Attorney at will, and even when a U.S. At-
torney's four-year term "expires," the U.S. Attorney "shall con-
tinue to perform the duties of his [or her] office until his [or
her] successor is appointed and qualifies."2 45
This analysis of Morrison would not be complete without a
discussion of Justice Scalia's impassioned and lone dissent in
which he argued that the Independent Counsel was a principal
officer, particularly considering the demise of the statutory au-
thority for the Independent Counsel in the wake of the White-
water Independent Counsel investigation.246 In his dissenting
opinion, Justice Scalia focused on the inverse relationship be-
242. "Most cases, of course, never reach the Supreme Court. They are fi-
nally determined in the district courts, the circuit courts of appeal, and in the
custom courts. They must be tried or defended without the spotlight, and yet
to all but a few they represent the administration of justice." CUMMINGS &
MCFARLAND, supra note 11, at 503.
243. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 672.
244. 28 U.S.C. § 541(b) (1994).
245. Id. One consequence of this four-year term is that the President may
have the authority to replace a U.S. Attorney occupying the office in excess of
four years with a recess appointment. This is because offices occupied by
"holdovers" (those serving in an office for which their term has expired) are
considered to be vacant in the eyes of the law. See Staebler v. Carter, 464 F.
Supp. 586, 594 (D.D.C. 1979) (concluding that where an incumbent is serving
past the statutorily defined tenure, the office is vacant within the meaning of
the Recess Appointments Clause of the Constitution (citing U.S. Const. art. II,
§ 2, cl. 2)); see also In re Farrow, 3 F. 112, 115-17 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1880) (recog-
nizing the President's right to make a recess appointment even where the
court had named a U.S. Attorney to fill the vacancy because the position re-
mained legally "vacant").
This suggests that when a U.S. Attorney has served more than four
years, the Attorney General could remove the incumbent by appointing a U.S.
Attorney pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 546(c). The replacement U.S. Attorney could
only serve for 120 days, however, at which time the authority would shift to
the district court to appoint a U.S. Attorney pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 546(d). It
would nonetheless allow the Attorney General to remove a U.S. Attorney
without presidential action. This hypothetical represents a removal authority
in the Attorney General that has not been heretofore exercised.
246. The Independent Counsel Act expired on June 30, 1999. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 599 (1994).
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tween independence and accountability that is inherent in the
creation of an Independent Counsel.247 Justice Scalia con-
cluded that the level of independence conferred on the Inde-
pendent Counsel would demand the accountability ensured
through presidential nomination and Senate confirmation.
248
Starting from the proposition that law enforcement-the
power to prosecute individuals for legal transgressions-is a
"quintessentially executive function,"2 49 Justice Scalia recog-
nized that "the balancing of various legal, practical, and politi-
cal considerations, none of which is absolute, is the very es-
sence of prosecutorial discretion."250 Because Justice Scalia did
not consider the Independent Counsel to be subordinate to the
Attorney General in the exercise of these core executive func-
tions, he could not consider the Independent Counsel to be an
inferior officer.25 ' In a significant recognition for determining
the status of U.S. Attorneys, Justice Scalia stated that "[elven
an officer who is subordinate to a department head can be a
principal officer."252
247. In the case of the Independent Counsel, loss of accountability proved
far from being merely an academic concept. The scenario predicted by Justice
Scalia played out perfectly in the impeachment of President Clinton. Im-
peachment-and the process leading up to it-is fraught with political conse-
quences for the members of Congress who are responsible for the administra-
tion of impeachment proceedings. The country was intended to endure such a
rending process only when political consensus could be developed to proceed.
One need look only as far back as Watergate to appreciate that the
system can work as planned. Congress undertook to investigate whether
President Nixon had betrayed the national trust. Although significant politi-
cal forces were mustered in opposition, Congress was able to convince the pub-
lic of the propriety of pursuing its investigation. It was an episode of historic
and constitutional significance. If Watergate illustrated what was wrong with
American government, it also surely illustrated the enduring wisdom and
strength of the Constitution. According to Professor Amar,
Prosecutorial self-dealing is not something that the Framers failed to
anticipate. And the solution they provided, based on publicity (via
grand juries, the press, and legislative oversight) and impeachment (if
necessary) still works and works well.... This, I suggest, is the les-
son that emerges when we compare Watergate-where the Framers'
system worked beautifully-with Whitewater, where the flawed stat-
ute has not.
Amar, supra note 151, at 803 n.216.
248. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 723, 728 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
249. Id. at 706.
250. Id. at 708.
251. Id. at 716-19.
252. Id. at 722 (referring to debates at the Constitutional Convention indi-
cating the Framers' assumption on this point and citing 2 MAX FARRAND, su-
pra note 28, at 627).
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If Morrison were the lone standard to be applied, it would
be easy to conclude that U.S. Attorneys constitute principal of-
ficers under the Appointments Clause. They are not removable
by the Attorney General (although, formally, they are subject to
her control); they exercise significant policy-setting discretion
over the range of federal law enforcement issues; their jurisdic-
tion is broad; and their tenure is, ostensibly, as long as the
President's and perhaps longer.
B. THE FORMAL APPROACH: EDMOND V. UNITED STATES
Morrison, however, is not the Court's last word on the
principal-versus-inferior-officer debate, and some commenta-
tors have questioned Morrison's continuing vitality after the
Court's 1997 decision in Edmond v. United States. 253 In that
case, with a solid majority behind his Appointments Clause ap-
proach, Justice Scalia recast the principal-versus-inferior-
officer inquiry in the mold of his Morrison dissent.
In Edmond, the Court considered whether judges on the
Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals (CGCCA) were princi-
pal or inferior officers. Because Congress vested the authority
to appoint CGCCA judges in the Secretary of Transportation (a
department head), the judges could only validly occupy such
positions if they could be characterized as inferior officers. 254
Edmond concedes that it would be difficult to categorize these
judges as inferior officers on the basis of their tenure or juris-
diction, both of which were key components of the Morrison
analysis. 255 This recognition, however, does not figure promi-
nently in the Edmond analysis. Seemingly unconstrained by
the reasoning in Morrison, the Edmond opinion borrows certain
sections from Morrison but fails to address other aspects.25 6 In-
253. 520 U.S. 651 (1997); see, e.g., Amar, supra note 151, at 810 (suggesting
that "the Court [has] apparently abandoned Morrison's ad hoc test"); Steven G.
Calabresi, The Structural Constitution and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty,
22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 3, 5 (1998) (reading Edmond as "essentially dis-
plac[ing] the faulty Appointments Clause analysis of Morrison v. Olson"); Nick
Bravin, Note, Is Morrison v. Olson Still Good Law? The Court's New Appoint-
ments Clause Jurisprudence, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1103 (1998). But cf United
States v. Hilario, 218 F.3d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 2000) ("The Edmond Court did not
overrule Morrison ... but cited it as precedent."), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 572
(2000).
254. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 660-61.
255. Id. at 661.
256. Ironically, Justice Scalia invokes the Ex parte Siebold precedent that
he so convincingly discredited in his Morrison dissent, asserting that the
Court had previously "found" an election supervisor to be an inferior officer.
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stead, Edmond makes supervision the touchstone of its princi-
pal-versus-inferior inquiry:
Generally speaking, the term "inferior officer" connotes a relation-
ship with some higher ranking officer or officers below the President:
Whether one is an "inferior" officer depends on whether he has a su-
perior. It is not enough that other officers may be identified who for-
mally maintain a higher rank, or possess responsibilities of a greater
magnitude.... Rather, in the context of a Clause designed to pre-
serve political accountability relative to important Government as-
signments, we think it evident that "inferior officers" are officers
whose work is directed and supervised at some level by others who
were appointed by Presidential nomination with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate.
257
Edmond makes no further attempt to define the necessary
amount of supervision except to say that the "directed-and-
supervised-at-some-level" standard is satisfied in the CGCCA
judge context. Edmond instead teaches by example, examining
how the work of judges on the CGCCA was supervised and di-
rected. The Court emphasized that the CGCCA judges could be
removed-without cause-by the Judge Advocate General of
the Coast Guard (a subordinate of the Secretary of Transporta-
tion):258 "The power to remove officers ... is a powerful tool for
control."2 9 Although the Court noted that CGCCAjudges exer-
cised some modicum of independence in their consideration and
adjudication of individual cases, it stressed that the Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces exercised appellate review over
the CGCCA's decisions: "What is significant is that the judges
of the Court of Criminal Appeals have no power to render a fi-
nal decision on behalf of the United States unless permitted to
do so by other Executive officers."260
Id. But cf. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 721-22 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (criticizing the majority's reliance on Ex parte Siebold because the Court
had not been presented with the principal versus inferior issue in Siebold but
had merely asserted, in dicta, that federal "Judges of Election" were inferior
officers). Moreover, the supervisors at issue in Siebold provide an inapt anal-
ogy because they were in essence merely poll observers with no prosecutorial
authority. See Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 379-80 (1879) (describing the
duties of election supervisors without reference to prosecutorial authority); see
also In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 485-86 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (characterizing
the duties of such commissioners as "relatively modest").
257. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 662-63; cf. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 722 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("Even an officer who is subordinate to a department head can be a
principal officer.").
258. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 664.
259. Id. (citing Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727 (1986), and Myers v.
United States, 272 U.S. 52, 121-36 (1926)).
260. Id. at 665. This description would not accurately describe the super-
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Justice Souter filed a concurrence in Edmond, reminding
the Court of Justice Scalia's admonition in Morrison: "Having a
superior officer is necessary for inferior officer status, but not
sufficient to establish it."2 61 After suggesting, in passing, that
the Solicitor General may be a principal officer despite his
statutory "inferiority" to the Attorney General, Justice Souter's
approach to the principal-versus-inferior dilemma reverts to
the Court's functional balancing test: "What is needed ... is a
detailed look at the powers and duties of these judges to see
whether reasons favoring their inferior officer status within the
constitutional scheme weigh more heavily than those to the
contrary."262 Justice Souter, after surveying the salient factors
with respect to the judges of the CGCCA, concurred in the de-
termination of their status as inferior officers.263
Edmond offers a contrasting approach to the Morrison Ap-
vision of U.S. Attorneys, who do possess the power to render a final decision
for the United States without being "permitted" to do so by some other execu-
tive-branch officer. The Edmond court focused on the appellate review to
which CGCCA judges are subjected. Id. at 664-65. In this way, the CGCCA is
"inferior" in the same way that lower federal courts are inferior to appellate
courts. Such an analogy does not characterize the relationship of U.S. Attor-
neys to Main Justice. Charles Ruff noted that, while the structure of appellate
review ensured uniformity within the courts, "We have not developed ...
within that part of the executive branch charged with representing the legal
interests of the federal government a comparable mechanism for controlling
diversity ofjudgment." Ruff, supra note 79, at 1205.
There are additional, significant distinctions between the nature of
appellate review regularly exercised by courts and the Attorney General's su-
pervision of criminal prosecutions. In the federal system, at least one appeal
is a matter of right; there is no such guarantee of review with respect to crimi-
nal prosecutions initiated by U.S. Attorneys. Moreover, an appellate court can
step in to prevent injustice from occurring by staying implementation of a trial
courts judgment until an appeal can be decided. Beyond the practical limita-
tions that limit the Attorney General's realistic supervision to only a fraction
of high profile or egregious cases, such supervision is generally invoked only
after the institution of criminal charges. Yet the initiation of an investigation
or the return of an indictment often occasions serious consequences (both in
reputation and money). Even if they are later abandoned, criminal investiga-
tions and prosecutions can have dire consequences on even the innocent sus-
pect or defendant. The supervision exercised by appellate courts, therefore, is
an inapt analogy to the Attorney General's supervision of a U.S. Attorney.
261. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 667 (Souter, J., concurring) (citing Morrison, 487
U.S. at 722 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
262. Id. at 668. As an element of the balancing test, Justice Souter sug-
gests that it is appropriate to defer "to the political branches' judgment" for
the determination of whether a particular officer has principal or inferior
status. Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 194 (1994) (Souter, J., concur-
ring).
263. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 668.
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pointments Clause jurisprudence: Edmond takes its cues from
the bare language of the Constitution and relies heavily on con-
temporaneous sources (i.e., the writings of the Framers and the
Acts of the First Congress) to inform the Court's analysis.
Nonetheless, while it refrains from the kind of functional bal-
ancing employed in Morrison, Edmond does not establish an
easily applied standard for subsequent cases. The Edmond
Court's inquiry focused on whether the officer's "work is di-
rected and supervised at some level by others who were ap-
pointed by Presidential nomination with the advice and consent
of the Senate."26 If so, according to the Court, they are inferior
officers. The level of supervision that distinguishes a principal
from an inferior officer, however, is not explained.
Under the Edmond rationale, there is a strong argument
that U.S. Attorneys are inferior officers because U.S. Attorneys
are, by statute, subject to the supervision and direction of the
Attorney General.26 Indeed, two United States Circuit Courts
have addressed this issue and found this supervision to be de-
terminative of the U.S. Attorneys' inferior status, relying on
Edmond.266  When called upon specifically to determine
whether U.S. Attorneys constitute principal or inferior officers,
the Ninth Circuit reconciled Edmond with Morrison by decid-
ing that "supervision by a superior officer is a sufficient but
perhaps not a necessary condition to the status of inferior offi-
cer."267 Under this formulation, which was subsequently
adopted by the First Circuit,268 U.S. Attorneys can be consid-
ered inferior officers. Although U.S. Attorneys are granted
wide latitude in the ordinary course of affairs, the Attorney
264. Id. at 663 (majority opinion). Professor Amar endorses this approach,
concluding that it is consistent with the usage of "inferior" in other parts of the
Constitution. See Amar, supra note 151, at 806-07 ("[W]hen Article III speaks
of 'inferior' courts, it likewise means 'inferior to' their superior-the Supreme
Court. Symmetrically, when the Article II Appointments Clause speaks of 'in-
ferior' officers, it likewise means 'inferior to' their superior-the relevant uni-
lateral appointing authority.").
265. See 28 U.S.C. § 519 (1994) (stating that the Attorney General "shall
direct all United States [Alttorneys... in the discharge of their respective du-
ties").
266. See United States v. Hilario, 218 F.3d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 2000), cert. de-
nied, 121 S. Ct. 572 (2000); United States v. Gantt, 194 F.3d 987, 999 (9th Cir.
1999).
267. Gantt, 194 F.3d at 999 n.6. It should be noted that this represents the
converse of the analysis suggested in Justice Souter's concurrence in Edmond.
See Edmond, 520 U.S. at 667 (Souter, J., concurring).
268. See Hilario, 218 F.3d at 25.
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General is statutorily empowered to supervise the U.S. Attor-
neys,269 remove them from any particular case,270 determine the
location of their offices, 271 and approve their staffing deci-
sions.2 7 2 The Attorney General, to be sure, has some authority
to supervise the work of the U.S. Attorney, therefore arguably
qualifying the U.S. Attorney for inferior-officer status under
the Edmond formulation.273
There are competing and compelling reasons to consider
U.S. Attorneys principal officers. In its simplicity, the Edmond
test would ignore the complex reality of federal law enforce-
ment, the tension between local autonomy and central control
that characterizes the relationship between U.S. Attorneys and
Main Justice, and the pervasive role of the U.S. Attorneys in
shaping and implementing policy on behalf of the United
States. The extent to which U.S. Attorneys are "supervised" by
the Attorney General defies characterization in typical hierar-
chical terms.274 U.S. Attorneys exercise a great deal of author-
ity that, for all intents and purposes, is unsupervised. 275 U.S.
Attorneys do not seek approval to initiate investigations, file
indictments, enter plea bargains, or prosecute cases at trial;
269. 28 U.S.C. § 519 (1994).
270. See id. § 518(b).
271. Id. § 545(b).
272. Id. § 550.
273. This analysis raises serious questions about the vitality of Morrison
and whether the Independent Counsel would still be considered an inferior
officer. See supra text accompanying note 251.
274. In determining the status of U.S. Attorneys, courts need not, and
should not, be constrained by the formal statutory inferiority of the U.S. At-
torneys if, in fact, they exercise the discretion indicative of a principal officer.
In defending the Supreme Court's determination that the Comptroller
General was subject to the will of Congress, and hence, institutionally unfit to
wield the budget-balancing axe of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, see Bow-
sher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727-34 (1986), Professor Strauss suggests that the
Court's analysis may have been properly informed by the actual relationship
that had developed between the Comptroller and Congress, and eschewed rel-
ance on formal, statutory definitions. See Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Func-
tional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions-A Foolish Inconsis-
tency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 498-99 (1987) ("The Court might have looked
more globally at the relationships between Congress and the General Account-
ing Office, seeing how the bundle of relationships, formal and informal, creates
for the agency a distinctive atmosphere and self-image that does not charac-
terize other agencies.").
275. See Frase, supra note 90, at 250 (arguing that while there is some
modicum of supervision, "In most cases ... the U.S. Attorney has complete
control over which charges, if any, will be filed in his district").
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nor is any such approval required.276 They do not seek permis-
sion from, or even inform, a supervisor who is ultimately
responsible to the Attorney General. In many instances, Main
Justice is not even aware of criminal prosecutions. The Attor-
ney General's immediate subordinates in Washington, D.C. are
only likely to become aware of and involved in a case when
there is a problem or negative publicity. Moreover, without the
authority to remove U.S. Attorneys, the Attorney General's ac-
tual authority is limited.277 For example, even when the Attor-
ney General attempts to exercise her supervisory authority,
U.S. Attorneys sometimes balk. As Professor Charles Ruff put
it, directives emanating from Main Justice are "most often hon-
ored in the breach."2 78
An additional and important distinction in determining
principal-versus-inferior status is removal authority. Removal
authority has always been associated with control: It is the sine
qua non of effective supervision-the guarantee that subordi-
nates will take direction. As the Court noted in Bowsher,
"[olnce an officer is appointed, it is only the authority that can
remove him ... that he must fear and, in the performance of
his functions, obey."279 U.S. Attorneys are removable only by
the President, but not by the Attorney General or any other ex-
ecutive-branch official. Although the removal authority is lo-
cated in the executive branch, Congress has denied that au-
thority to the Attorney General, signaling the functional
independence of U.S. Attorneys.280
It is important to note that there is nothing inconsistent or
inherently unconstitutional in the autonomy that U.S. Attor-
neys exercise; Congress enjoys wide latitude in establishing the
structure of the executive branch. The autonomy of the U.S.
Attorneys most likely represents a policy choice by Congress to
maintain "a moderating balance of power between... Wash-
276. See Ruff, supra note 79, at 1204 ("n the great majority of cases han-
dled by the United States [Attorneys, the Criminal Division is unfamiliar
with the development of the investigation, and the prosecutive decision is made
before the Division has an opportunity to act." (emphasis added)).
277. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
278. Ruff, supra note 79, at 1207-08.
279. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 726 (quoting Synar v. United States, 626 F.
Supp. 1374, 1401 (D.D.C. 1986)).
280. See Ruff, supra note 79, at 1205 ("Statutorily, the commands of the
Attorney General and his designees bind the United States [Aittorneys, but
the presidential commission provides more than merely symbolic support for
the exercise of independent discretion.").
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ington and the districts."2 81 Such an arrangement may be en-
tirely appropriate, but it indicates that U.S. Attorneys are prin-
cipal officers and therefore must be appointed only pursuant to
the President's nomination and the Senate's confirmation.
Ultimately, while the Edmond rule may be simpler than a
functional-balancing analysis, it is not necessarily clearer and
has the potential to undermine drastically the accountability
sought by the Appointments Clause. Officials exercising the
discretion reposed in the U.S. Attorneys ought to be a reflection
on the politicians who chose them (i.e., the President and the
Senate).28 2 Where there is disaffection with the U.S. Attorney,
the citizens of that jurisdiction should be able to blame the
President and their Senators. By cutting out the elected
branches, the court appointment of U.S. Attorneys leaves citi-
zens without a clear path to affect prosecutorial priorities. One
traditional method for the political control over prosecutorial
authority involves contacting Representatives and Senators so
that these individuals can gauge a U.S. Attorney's performance
and express displeasure if, in their judgment, the prosecutor is
not acting in the public interest. Where the traditional nomi-
nation and confirmation process has been adhered to, the U.S.
Attorney will have ample incentive to heed even informal dis-
approval from her political patrons. Because U.S. Attorneys
belong to the same political community and in many instances
rely upon political support for their plans,283 they are likely to
respond to the priorities and criticisms of locally elected offi-
cials. There is nothing inherently nefarious in this; the Fram-
ers were all too familiar with prosecutorial power that was not
politically accountable and rejected this structure.8 4
281. Richman, supra note 79, at 787-88; see id. at 810 ("What the evidence
strongly suggests ... is that Congress gives considerable attention to the bal-
ance of power between Washington and the [U.S. Attorneys'] districts, and
that its failure to impose more approval requirements reflects, not apathy or
thrift, but a conscious selection of a particular equilibrium."); see also Ruff, su-
pra note 79, at 1205 (suggesting that "responsiveness to varying local concerns
by the criminal justice system is not only acceptable, but desirable").
282. Under our system of government, the primary check against prosecu-
torial abuse is a political one. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 728 (1989)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
283. For a discussion of the aspirations and subsequent political careers of
U.S. Attorneys, see EISENSTEIN, supra note 6, at 229-31. See also Dan M. Ka-
han, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 469,
486 (1996) ("U.S. Attorneys are extraordinarily ambitious and frequently enter
electoral politics after leaving office.").
284. See Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 883 (1991); In re Sealed
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Likewise, where there is a vacancy in the office, citizens
ought to be able to look at the process and judge their leaders
accordingly. If the Senate has blocked the President's nomi-
nee(s), the Senator responsible for blocking the nomination can
be held accountable. 285 Court appointment of U.S. Attorneys
undermines this process of accountability and in so doing evis-
cerates the protections of the Appointments Clause. It allows
the President and the Senate to avoid making constitutionally
prescribed political decisions by which they are intended to be
evaluated. It also may place courts on the receiving end of
criticisms more appropriately directed at the politically respon-
sive branches.
The Hilario court reasoned that "Congress may well have
determined that it would be worse for a district to be without a
United States Attorney than for the district to have one who
had not been nominated and confirmed in the ordinary course,
no matter how long the interim appointment lasted. 28 6 Be-
cause U.S. Attorneys are principal officers of the United States,
however, the Constitution, via the Appointments Clause, de-
nies Congress the power to make this determination.
IV. INCONGRUITY WITH APPROPRIATE JUDICIAL
FUNCTIONS
Assuming that U.S. Attorneys are inferior officers, a literal
reading of the Excepting Clause permits their appointment by
"courts of law."287 There are some limits, however, on the type
Case, 838 F.2d 476, 487 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (describing the Framers' experience
with abusive prosecutorial practices that made them 'justly fearful of this
[prosecutorial] power"), rev'd sub nom. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
285. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
286. United States v. Hilario, 218 F.3d 19, 23 (1st Cir. 2000), cert. denied,
121 S. Ct. 572 (2000).
287. This textual grant of authority to the courts of law distinguishes the
appointment power from other contexts where Congress has vested the courts
with authority outside the traditional judicial sphere. See Morrison, 487 U.S.
at 678-79; Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 398 (1879). Courts have steadfastly
insisted that they may not act outside the context of the "cases or controver-
sies" to which Article III extends "the judicial [plower of the United States."
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 123 (1976) (per cu-
riam) ([Elxecutive or administrative duties of a nonjudicial nature may not be
imposed on judges holding office under Art. III of the Constitution." (citing
United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40 (1852))).
Proposals to vest judges with additional roles were rejected at the Consti-
tutional Convention because the Framers were concerned that too much in-
volvement with the political branches would undermine the independence of
the judiciary. See 1 MAX FARRAND, supra note 28, at 430 (comments of Luther
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of inferior executive-branch officials that judges may properly
appoint.2 8 One such limitation recognized by the Court sug-
gests that "Congress'[s] decision to vest the appointment power
in the courts would be improper if there was some 'incongruity'
between the functions normally performed by the courts
and... their duty to appoint."289 The incongruity inquiry seeks
Martin) (arguing that the people would lose confidence in the impartiality of
judges if judges were vested with extra-judicial authority)). Thus, courts have
refused to give advisory opinions. See United States v. Frehauf, 365 U.S. 146,
157 (1961) (listing cases in which the Court refused to issue advisory opin-
ions); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911). Courts have also refused
to adjudicate cases where such judgments are subject to another branch's re-
view on the merits. See Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 411 n.2 (1792)
(refusing to adjudicate war pensions claims because the courts' judgments
were to be subjected to review by the Department of the Treasury, and as
such, "inconsistent with the independence of [the judiciary]"). "But the duty to
appoint inferior officers, when required thereto by law, is a constitutional duty
of the courts," and thus falls outside the normal prohibition. Siebold, 100 U.S.
at 398. Even though the Appointments Clause authorizes such action, courts
should be wary of accepting such power from the political branches because it
implicates their independence.
288. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.
361, 385 (1989) (characterizing judicial appointments of inferior officers as
constitutional "unless Congress has vested in the [judges] powers that are
more appropriately performed by the other Branches or that undermine the
integrity of the Judiciary").
One plausible reading of the Excepting Clause would have prohibited
all inter-branch appointments, such that "courts of law" would be limited to
appointing inferior judicial officers, such as clerks. Commentators have sug-
gested this as a rational limiting principle to the Appointment power, and this
approach was alluded to by the Court in early opinions. Although the Su-
preme Court opined that "[tihe appointing power.., was no doubt intended to
be exercised by the department of the government to which the officer to be
appointed most appropriately belonged," Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.)
225, 257-58 (1839) (holding that courts could appoint their own clerks), there
is "no absolute requirement to this effect." Siebold, 100 U.S. at 397.
Professor Amar makes an interesting argument that inter-branch ap-
pointments do not comport with a holistic reading of the Constitution. See
Amar, supra note 151, at 747 (1999). But cf. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 27,
at 117 n.482 (positing that the limits of acceptable arrangements under the
Excepting Clause may constitute a non-justiciable issue because the Clause
grants Congress the discretion to structure such appointments "as they think
proper" (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2)). Inter-branch appointments,
however, have been validated, see Siebold, 100 U.S. at 397-98, and this Article
does not argue that inter-branch appointments are per se unconstitutional.
Rather, this Article focuses on the appropriate limits of inter-branch appoint-
ments.
289. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 676 (citing Siebold, 100 U.S. at 398); see also
Hilario, 218 F.3d at 26-27 ("[Tlhe district court's appointment power over in-
terim United States Attorneys 'is not unconstitutional unless Congress has
vested in the [judges] powers that are more appropriately performed by the
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to determine whether "the appointment of the officers in ques-
tion could, with any greater propriety, and... with equal re-
gard to convenience, have been assigned to any other deposi-
tary of official power."290
In 1880, the Supreme Court, in Ex parte Siebold,291 first
recognized the validity of inter-branch appointments but also
introduced the incongruity analysis to limit such appointments.
Siebold examined the court appointment of "judges of election,"
who served as poll watchers for congressional elections.292 The
defendants, Siebold among them, had been convicted of engag-
ing in election fraud.293 In appealing their convictions, the
judges of election challenged their own inter-branch appoint-
ments as violative of the Appointments Clause.294 The Su-
preme Court emphasized that the Constitution explicitly au-
thorized courts to exercise appointive power.295 As such, where
the law conferred appointive authority on the courts it became
a "constitutional duty" of the courts to make appointments
unless there was "such incongruity in the duty required as to
excuse the courts from its performance, or to render their acts
void."296 It was determined in Siebold that, with respect to
election supervisors, appointment by the district court was not
"incongruous" with appropriate judicial activity.297
Siebold does not necessarily support the significant exten-
sions of inter-branch appointments to which it has been ap-
plied. It has been suggested that the propriety of Congress
vesting the appointment of election supervisors in the courts
other Branches or that undermine the integrity of the Judiciary." (quoting
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 385)).
290. Siebold, 100 U.S. at 398. In concluding that judges could not properly
sit on an advisory panel investigating organized crime, the Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit framed the inquiry slightly differently: "[Does the
imposition of powers traditionally associated with one branch of government
on officials of another branch interfere with their ability to perform their con-
stitutionally-required duties in the branch of which they are a part?" In re
Application of President's Comm'n on Organized Crime, 763 F.2d 1191, 1196-
97 (11th Cir. 1985).
291. 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
292. Id. at 373.
293. Id. at 377-79. Siebold, for example, was convicted of "the offence
commonly known as 'stuffing the ballot-box.'" Id. at 379.
294. Id. at 397.
295. Id. at 397-98 (stating that "the duty to appoint inferior officers, when
required thereto by law, is a constitutional duty of the courts").
296. Id. at 398.
297. Id.
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was influenced by Congress's right, recognized in the Constitu-
tion, to superintend the election of its own members.298 The
Siebold opinion focused on the "important" and "fundamental"
right of Congress to supervise the election of its own mem-
bers299 and cautioned that "it must be remembered that we are
dealing only with the subject of elections of representatives to
Congress." 30o
Court appointment of U.S. Attorneys is incongruous be-
cause it threatens to undermine judicial impartiality, and the
appearance of impartiality,3 1 by thrusting courts into partisan,
political battles. As Professor Harold Krent points out, "Judges
who become too closely aligned with the interests of another
branch cannot be expected to maintain their impartiality in ad-
judicating that other branch's interests, and the public at large
may lose faith in the judiciary's independence."30 2 Judges need
to protect not only the integrity of the other branches, but their
own integrity and impartiality as well: "Impartiality is one of
the central, constitutionally-ordained, requirements of the fed-
eral judicial office."30 3 Moreover, "even if a judge could satisfy
himself that he could separate his participation [in executive-
branch activities] from his judicial functions, it is not clear that
litigants could sustain equal faith in his impartiality."30 4 Ap-
298. See Note, The Proposed Court-Appointed Special Prosecutor: In Quest
of a Constitutional Justification, 87 YALE L.J. 1692, 1697-98 n.27 (1978) (cit-
ing Dean Roger Cramton's opinion that "Siebold was merely an affirmation of
congressional power to enact legislation pursuant to its duty to investigate the
qualifications of its own members and did not involve criminal law enforce-
ment"). One distinguished jurist has lamented that the courts should not pre-
sume the validity of all congressionally approved inter-branch appointments
on the basis of such "conflicting and ambiguous language in 19th century
cases." Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F.Supp. 902, 921 (D.D.C. 1967) (Skelly Wright,
J., dissenting).
299. Siebold, 100 U.S. at 382.
300. Id. at 393.
301. See Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) ("[Jlustice must
satisfy the appearance ofjustice.").
302. Krent, supra note 124, at 1302 n. 204.
303. In re Application of President's Comm'n on Organized Crime, 763 F.2d
1191, 1197 (11th Cir. 1985) (citing United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980));
see also Irving R. Kaufman, The Essence of Judicial Independence, 80 COLUM.
L. REV. 671 (1980) (discussing the development of an independent judiciary in
the United States and its importance in the constitutional framework).
304. Application of President's Comm'n on Organized Crime, 763 F.2d at
1197. Although the quoted passage criticizes judges' participation in a presi-
dential advisory commission, the reasoning applies a fortiori to the appoint-
ment of the chief prosecutor in the judges' own district.
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pointing a prosecutor is intrinsically a political decision.305 Se-
lecting a U.S. Attorney requires making political judgments
about what a district's prosecutorial priorities should be and
who is best suited to realize those goals. In recognition of the
inherently political nature of appointments, the Code of Judi-
cial Conduct admonishes judges "not [to] make unnecessary
appointments."30 6 Judges provide an institutional buffer be-
tween the individual and the immense power wielded by the
prosecutor. If the judge has appointed the supervisory prosecu-
tor, then judicial independence, vital to the role of judges and to
the public's perception of fairness, is undermined.
The controversy surrounding the court appointment of the
Whitewater Independent Counsel resulted in harsh criticism of
Judge David Sentelle and is a textbook example of the perils
associated with the court appointment of prosecutors. Shortly
before announcing the appointment of the Whitewater Inde-
pendent Counsel, Judge Sentelle met with two leading conser-
vative Republican Senators, both of whom were long accus-
tomed to picking prosecutors and both of whom were publicly
opposed to many of the policies advocated by then-President
Clinton.30 7 The meeting generated intensely bad press for the
court and for the perceived lack of independence of courts in
general.308 As criticism of the Whitewater Independent Coun-
sel mounted, so too did criticism of the court's role in naming
305. See In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct or Disability, 39 F.3d 374,
380-82 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Judicial Council of the D.C. Circuit) (upholding the
propriety of judges consulting with political leaders and others in considering
who to appoint as independent counsel); id. at 380 ("It is hard to imagine how
anyone would go about [the task of selecting an Independent Counsel] without
seeking advice [from outside sources].").
306. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C(4) (1998). The statu-
tory authority to appoint U.S. Attorneys arguably makes such appointments
"necessary," see Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 398 (1879), even though the
grant of authority is permissive. However, this specific reference in Canon 3
of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which deals with the preservation of judicial
impartiality, reveals the seriousness of the concerns that arise when judges
appoint prosecutors.
307. See Howard Schneider, Judge Met Senator Faireloth Before Fiske Was
Ousted, WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 1994, at Al (reporting on a lunch meeting be-
tween Judge David Sentelle, the only judge from the D.C. Circuit-and the
presiding judge-on the Special Division, and two Republican Senators); see
also Charge of Judicial Misconduct or Disability, 39 F.3d at 377 (describing
the facts surrounding charges against Judge Sentelle for judicial misconduct).
308. See, e.g., Susan Schmidt, Former ABA Presidents Criticize Panel That
Chose Starr, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 1994, at A9 (reporting on a statement is-
sued by the former ABA presidents urging the special division to not only be
objective, but to maintain an appearance of objectivity).
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him, and the perceived partisan political nature of the ap-
pointment.
30 9
These criticisms raise similar concerns about whether any
interaction between judges and Department of Justice officials
should occur with respect to appointing U.S. Attorneys. The
regular, informal interaction between top Justice Department
officials and the chief judge of the district court responsible for
selecting an interim U.S. Attorney ought to put judges on no-
tice that the court-appointment process jeopardizes their im-
partiality. It is unseemly, if not inappropriate, for district court
judges to offer their comments to executive-branch officials on
prospective executive-branch appointees-even interim ap-
pointees-who will appear before them. A judge may be in-
clined to select a U.S. Attorney who shares the judge's ideologi-
cal or prosecutorial philosophy.310 Alternatively, a judge may
recommend that the Justice Department select as interim U.S.
Attorney a prosecutor who the judge perceives as apt to settle
cases and enter plea bargains, and thus viewed as likely to pre-
serve judicial resources. Of course, prosecutorial philosophy
and policy priorities properly inform the selection of U.S. At-
torneys who, after all, are supposed to represent the President's
administration. But weighing these various factors is inher-
ently political and has practical implications for the district
court's docket. This conflict of interest undermines the inde-
pendence and even skepticism with which judges should scru-
tinize prosecutors.311 The incongruity concern is particularly
acute in the court appointment of a U.S. Attorney because "the
greater the policy-making power of the appointee.., the more
309. See HISTORICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF U.S. INDEPENDENT COUNSEL
INVESTIGATIONS 305-07 (Gerald S. Greenberg ed., 2000) (noting criticism of
Judge Sentelle's role in appointing Whitewater Independent Counsel and con-
cluding that "[plublic confidence ... suffers whenever the integrity of the judi-
cial appointment process appears compromised"); CHARLES A. JOHNSON &
DANETTE BRICKMAN, INDEPENDENT COUNSEL: THE LAW AND THE
INVESTIGATIONS 226-27 (2001) (discussing the persistent criticism of the Inde-
pendent-Counsel-appointment process during the Whitewater investigation).
310. As Justice Scalia noted in dissent in Morrison v. Olson, judges are
human and can be influenced by politics. 487 U.S. 654, 730 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the panel of judges who select an Independent Coun-
sel may be influenced by their own political views and that there would be no
remedy to cure any negative consequences).
311. The impropriety of this contact is compounded by the fact that the De-
partment of Justice administers the process for selecting presidential nomi-
nees to the Courts of Appeal, who are often times chosen from the ranks of sit-
ting district court judges.
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incongruous and improper it is for Congress to vest the ap-
pointment of that official in a court."312
In light of the similarities between the U.S. Attorney and
the Independent Counsel, Morrison's incongruity analysis,
which upheld the court appointment of the Independent Coun-
sel, has to be considered. In Morrison, the Court dismissed the
incongruity concerns with respect to appointing the Independ-
ent Counsel,313 and many of the reasons on which the Court re-
lied apply with equal force to U.S. Attorneys. For instance, the
Court recalled its precedents allowing courts to appoint "pri-
vate attorneys to act as prosecutor for judicial contempt [pro-
ceedings]"; 314 "United States commissioners, who exercised cer-
tain limited prosecutorial powers";315 and U.S. Marshals, whom
the Court "indicated" in Siebold could be appointed by courts of
law.316 "[In light of judicial experience with prosecutors in
312. Constance O'Keefe & Peter Safirstein, Note, Fallen Angels, Separation
of Powers, and the Saturday Night Massacre: An Examination of the Practical,
Constitutional, and Political Tensions in the Special Prosecutor Provisions of
the Ethics in Government Act, 49 BROOK. L. REV. 113, 133 (1982). Although
O'Keefe and Safirstein recognize that "the United States [A]ttorney is cer-
tainly a policy-maker and the nature of his duties require him to answer to the
President," they credited the reasoning of the district court in Solomon for up-
holding the court appointment of U.S. Attorneys: "[Tihe exercise of the ap-
pointive power ... in no wise [binds] the executive .... mhe executive branch
is free to choose another United States Attorney at any time." Id. at 134
(quoting United States v. Solomon, 216 F. Supp. 835, 838-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1963)
(upholding the validity of 28 U.S.C. § 506, the precursor to 28 U.S.C. § 546)).
The authors conclude that "[aibsent a provision for such a choice by the Presi-
dent, the judicial appointment of a United States [Attorney would clearly be
incongruous with separation of powers considerations." Id.
Of course, the executive is not free to choose another U.S. Attorney.
The provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 541 require the President to submit his nominee
for that office to the Senate for approval; only then can a presidentially ap-
pointed U.S. Attorney replace the one appointed by the court. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 541 (1994). But cf In re Farrow, 3 F. 112, 115 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1880) (holding
that a prosecutorial office filled by a court appointee is "vacant," thereby
granting the President the power to replace the court appointee by means of a
recess appointment). So even though the President can remove a district
court-appointed U.S. Attorney, the President cannot replace a U.S. Attorney
without the Senate's concurrence. Moreover, the President is required to ex-
pend political capital to remove a district court's appointee.
313. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 676-77.
314. Id. at 676.
315. Id. (citing Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344
(1931)). The role of the United States commissioners, featured so prominently
in this discussion, is very ambiguous. In another part of the Morrison opinion,
they are characterized as "court officials." Id. at 679 n.16.
316. See id. at 679 n.16.
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criminal cases, it could be said that courts are especially well
qualified to appoint prosecutors."317 The Court even pointed to
the court appointment of U.S. Attorneys, and the lone district
court opinion upholding its constitutionality, giving at least
tacit approval to the practice.3 18
In rejecting the incongruity argument in Morrison, how-
ever, the Supreme Court emphasized the significance of the
structural protections of the Ethics in Government Act, which
shielded the judiciary from conflicts of interest and the appear-
ance of impropriety:
In the light of the Act's provision making the judges of the Special Di-
vision ineligible to participate in any matters relating to an inde-
pendent counsel they have appointed... we do not think that ap-
pointment of the independent counsel by the court runs afoul of the
constitutional limitation on "incongruous" interbranch appoint-
ments.
319
Such protection is entirely absent in the U.S.-Attorney-
appointment process. The district court cannot recuse itself
from the cases prosecuted by its U.S. Attorney because the U.S.
Attorney is responsible for the majority of cases handled by the
court.
Instead of relying on the supposed independence that
judges bring to the appointment process, § 546(d) relies on the
intimate familiarity of district judges with the prominent law-
yers in their community. This may represent a rational choice
by Congress. It may even lead to higher quality appointments
in some instances--district judges are likely to be familiar with
317. Id. at 676 n.13.
318. Id. at 676 (citing United States v. Solomon, 216 F. Supp. 835 (S.D.N.Y.
1963)).
319. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 677. The Judicial Council of the D.C. Circuit
cited this structural protection in validating the propriety of judges seeking
the advice of political leaders and others in choosing an independent counsel.
See In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct or Disability, 39 F.3d 374, 380 (D.C.
Cir. 1994) (discussing the statute prohibiting judges from presiding in cases
argued by their appointees); see also In re President's Comm'n on Organized
Crime, 783 F.2d 370, 381 (3d Cir. 1986) (upholding judges' participation in
presidential commission because they could recuse themselves from related
cases). But cf In re Application of President's Comm'n on Organized Crime,
763 F.2d 1191, 1196-98 (11th Cir. 1985) (finding a judge's participation, even
as an individual as opposed to qua judicial officer, inconsistent with appropri-
ate judicial activity); Ronald L. Krotoszynski, Jr., On the Danger of Wearing
Two Hats: Mistretta and Morrison Revisited, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 417,
472-75 (1997) (arguing that Morrison v. Olson was wrongly decided because
the court appointment of independent counsels undermines judicial independ-
ence and neutrality).
2001] COURTAPPOINTMENT OF U.S. ATTORNEYS 431
local legal talent, in many instances through the judges' former
service in the office of the U.S. Attorney. In exercising the au-
thority to appoint U.S. Attorneys, however, district courts jeop-
ardize their institutional impartiality. As Judge Skelly Wright
warned, the court appointment of government officials nor-
mally selected through the political process
cash[es] in on the judicial reputation. Most critically, public confi-
dence in the judiciary is indispensable to the operation of the rule of
law; yet this quality is placed in risk whenever judges step outside the
courtroom into the vortex of political activity. Judges should be saved
"from the entanglements, at times the partisan suspicions, so often
the result of other and conflicting duties."
320
The courts should reject the court appointment of U.S. Attor-
neys because it "risks politicizing the judiciary."321
As the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit acknowledged
in United States v. Hilario, "[Slection 546(d) lacks some of the
safeguards that courts have relied on in the past when they
have determined that the impartiality of the Judicial Branch
would not be affected by judges' performing interbranch as-
signments. 322 Most prominently, the district judges must con-
sider the cases and controversies brought before them by the
very U.S. Attorney whom they have selected. Asking judges to
choose the prosecutor of their liking requires the judges to step
outside their traditional role of impartiality. Yet this imparti-
ality is the single greatest asset of the judiciary-conferring on
courts their legitimacy and the standing that courts enjoy as
the accepted arbiter of justice.
Furthermore, when judges select prosecutors, prosecutorial
accountability is sacrificed. Defendants can hardly be expected
320. Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902, 923 (D.D.C. 1967) (Skelly
Wright, J., dissenting). But cf id. at 911 (majority opinion) (arguing that the
Appointments Clause represents "a deliberate decision by the Framers to en-
able Congress in its wisdom to authorize 'the Courts of Law' to share with the
executive the appointing power of federal officers").
321. According to Professor Amar,
Federal judges are given life tenure to remove them from daily poli-
tics, but the Independent Counsel statute risks politicizing the judici-
ary .... Judges will not be good at picking prosecutors because they
have inadequate information and weak incentives. Whereas the At-
torney General has a wealth of information about the track record of
prosecutors, judges do not and should not have access to this treasure
trove of intra-executive intelligence, implicating various out-of-court
activities that lie beyond the proper province of judicial supervision.
Amar, supra note 151, at 809.
322. United States v. Hilario, 218 F.3d 19, 28 (1st Cir. 2000), cert. denied,
121 S. Ct. 572 (2000).
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to hold the court responsible for a bad appointment, at least not
on the record. "Judges, after all, have life tenure, and appoint-
ing a surefire enthusiastic prosecutor could hardly be consid-
ered an impeachable offense. So if there is anything wrong
with the selection, there is effectively no one to blame."323
When defendants, and in particular, defense counsel appear be-
fore a court with the knowledge that the prosecutor was per-
sonally selected by the court, it cannot help but unsettle their
confidence in the court's impartiality. This posture is likely to
have an effect on the adversarial tactics defense counsel will be
willing to employ, thereby undermining the fairness of the ad-
versarial system. Who wants to tell a judge that his or her ap-
pointee has acted improperly? Yet we expect defense counsel to
play such a role. Indeed, we rely on the adversarial system to
ensure due process and fair play, and consequently, to buttress
confidence in the courts. Moreover, as a matter of human na-
ture, judges will naturally find it difficult to criticize their cho-
sen prosecutor. 324 In the adjudication of cases, it is beneficial
that judges are institutionally aloof and not responsive to the
political will. This makes judges uniquely ill-suited to choose
chief prosecutors.
There is a final distinction that distinguishes the incongru-
ity analysis in this context from the court appointment of the
Independent Counsel. The raison d'etre of the Independent
Counsel was to create an officer not appointed by the executive
branch.325 If such an officer was allowed to exist under the
Constitution, as the Morrison Court concluded, then it was in-
evitable that the judicial branch would exercise its appoint-
ment authority in furtherance of this valid congressional pur-
pose. This argument is inapplicable in the U.S. Attorney
context because U.S. Attorneys are regularly selected through
the political process. Instead, court appointment of U.S. Attor-
323. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 730 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Amar, supra
note 151, at 809 ("[Wlhen an appointing authority is picking its own assistant,
it obviously has strong incentives to pick well. If the subordinate does a bad
job, other government officials and ordinary citizens will and should blame the
boss.").
324. Some might argue that this natural sympathy would make the ap-
pointing judges even more critical of the U.S. Attorney's performance. This,
too, undermines the propriety of having the judges make such an appoint-
ment. Judges should scrutinize the actions of the U.S. Attorney as the repre-
sentative of a coordinate branch of government, not more and not less.
325. See In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct or Disability, 39 F.3d 374, 382
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (stating that the "entire purpose" of the Independent Counsel
Act was to provide "independence from the Executive Branch").
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neys exposes courts to scrutiny and criticism for undertaking a
responsibility usually discharged by politicians.
The Hilario court attempts to justify the practice by analo-
gizing it to criminal defendants' constitutional right to be rep-
resented by an attorney:
In context, the appointment of defense counsel for indigent criminal
defendants would seem to be a necessary step for judges to take in or-
der to provide for fair process. That rationale applies to the appoint-
ment of interim United States Attorneys with equal force. It is in
keeping with preserving the institutional integrity of the judiciary
that judges, faced with an indefinite vacancy in the office of United
States Attorney, seek out a competent lawyer to represent the gov-
ernment.
326
This analysis misperceives the structural and practical consid-
erations at issue by misconstruing a critical distinction between
courts appointing defense counsel and U.S. Attorneys. Unless
there is a legislative provision for appointing defense counsel to
represent indigent defendants, courts either appoint them or
there will be none. Structurally, criminal prosecutions do not
require defense counsel; for much of our nation's history, de-
fense counsel was only required to be furnished to those who
could afford to pay for it. 327 Such injustice, however, clearly
implicates the court's integrity. The Gideon case establishes
that criminal defendants have a constitutional right to coun-
sel.328  A criminal trial requires a prosecutor, on the other
hand, not only to ensure that the government has an able advo-
cate, but also to exercise prosecutorial discretion to determine
in the first instance whether to file criminal charges and what
charges to pursue. Because the decision to file criminal charges
is a matter conferred exclusively to the executive branch and is
not reviewable, a court is forced to preside over a criminal trial
only after the prosecutor makes a positive determination that
criminal charges are warranted. 329 The Hilario court appears
326. Hilario, 218 F.3d at 28-29.
327. See WILLIAiM M. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN
COURTS 21-33 (1955) (describing the development of constitutional jurispru-
dence on the right to counsel).
328. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963).
329. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) ("[The Executive
Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to
prosecute a case . . . ."); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 4 CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 13.2(a) (2d ed. 1999) (discussing the prosecutor's discretion in
deciding whether to prosecute); O'Keefe & Safirstein, supra note 312, at 132
n.83 (listing cases describing prosecutorial responsibilities as an executive
fimction).
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to assume that the United States is just another party to fed-
eral criminal prosecutions that happen to end up in front of the
courts. Such a characterization misconstrues the role of the
government in such prosecutions. The United States is not just
a party to criminal prosecutions-it is the sovereign prosecut-
ing the charge(s) and vindicating the right of the people to de-
mand justice. The necessity of a court's authority to appoint
defense counsel is not analogous to the authority to appoint
prosecutors. 330
The judicial role is meant to be a passive one: Judges rule
on cases and controversies that are presented by active, inter-
ested litigants. Our adversarial criminal justice system pre-
sumes that justice is best served when each side is given the
opportunity to put its best case forward and a neutral third
party determines the outcome. 331 It is a bedrock of contempo-
rary constitutional jurisprudence that justice is not served if
criminal defendants do not have a learned advocate to contest
the charge and test the evidence. 332 Judges are compelled by
forces outside their control, namely prosecutors, to secure
criminal defense counsel in order to maintain the courts' integ-
rity. The reverse proposition is not true with respect to prose-
cutors: Judges, as judges, do not have an interest in whether
330. The Hilario opinion attempts to bolster its argument that the court
appointment of prosecutors "is in keeping with preserving the institutional
integrity of the judiciary" by citing to Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et
Fils S.A. See Hilario, 218 F.3d at 29 (citing 481 U.S. 787, 800-01 (1987)).
Young, however, cannot support the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit's
judicial-integrity argument. In Young, the Supreme Court criticized the dis-
trict court for appointing private counsel (with an interest in the outcome) to
prosecute a contempt-of-court charge. Young, 481 U.S. at 802. The Supreme
Court did recognize an inherent authority in the judiciary to convene con-
tempt-of-court proceedings to ensure that its orders are respected and the in-
tegrity of the courts maintained. Id. at 800-01. But the Court held that courts
must request the executive branch to prosecute the contempt charge(s) in the
first instance; only when and if the executive branch refuses to prosecute the
contempt charge(s) can the court appoint a prosecutor pursuant to the court's
inherent authority to vindicate its own orders. Id. at 800-02.
Such inherent authority is inapposite in the context of criminal prose-
cutions. Courts have no inherent authority or any legitimate interest in the
institution of criminal proceedings outside the limited circumstance of crimi-
nal contempt for lack of compliance with a court's own orders.
331. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-71 (1932) (recognizing that the
right to effective assistance of counsel is fundamental to due process).
332. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 394 (1985) (recognizing the "obvious
truth that lawyers are 'necessities, not luxuries' in our adversarial system of
criminal justice" (quoting Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344)).
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criminal charges are filed.333 Thus, by selecting U.S. Attorneys,
judges lose their institutional distance and impartiality as to
whether charges are filed (or settled). In addition, court ap-
pointment also raises the specter that, by choosing a prosecutor
of the their liking, charges will be brought or disposed of in fur-
therance of the judges' real or perceived agendas. These same
issues simply do not arise in the context of providing defense
counsel to the indigent. 334
On a more practical level, the government is not without
prosecutors, even in the absence of U.S. Attorneys. The various
offices of the U.S. Attorneys are staffed with career prosecutors.
Assistant U.S. Attorneys actually conduct the litigation to
which the United States is a party-a massive caseload of
157,987 cases pending in fiscal year 1999. 335 These Assistant
U.S. Attorneys ensure continuity through changes in leader-
ship. It is unclear why the Hilario court feels the need to im-
pose a judicially selected supervisor on the prosecutors who
would otherwise look to executive-branch appointees-the At-
torney General and other Department of Justice officials-for
direction.336
The court appointment provision of § 546 interjects judges
into a political decision that is incongruous with proper judicial
functions. Although judges may have the expertise needed to
select good prosecutors, such appointments compromise the
333. See CUMI.INGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 11, at 511 ("The admini-
stration and enforcement of the laws ... begin not in the courts but in the of-
fices and agencies of government to which necessarily there has been commit-
ted the authority to enforce many statutes. This, indeed, is the gist of the
executive function.").
334. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(articulating the "fundamental value determination of our society that it is far
worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free").
335. ExEcuTIvE OFFICE FOR U.S. ATTORNEYs, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, su-
pra note 13, at 16, 75 (discussing the total number of pending civil and crimi-
nal cases at the end of fiscal year 1999); see also id. at 130-32 (presenting a
table of the total pending cases).
336. See United States v. Hilario, 218 F.3d 19, 29 (1st Cir. 2000) ("[Judges'
appointment of an interim United States Attorney assists the functioning of
the court: at bottom, it assures the skillful processing of cases in which the
United States is a party."), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 572 (2000).
The Hilario analysis proves too much when it represents that federal
prosecutorial authority is unacceptably compromised when the office of U.S.
Attorney is vacant; such an argument undermines its conclusion that U.S. At-
torneys are inferior officers. If a U.S. Attorney is so crucial to the functioning
of the executive branch in its enforcement of the laws, surely U.S. Attorneys
are principal officers whom the President must select.
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courts' impartiality and create the appearance of a conflict of
interest.
V. COURT APPOINTMENT OF U.S. ATTORNEYS AND THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS
The processes of appointing inferior officers, even those
whose court appointment is not incongruous with appropriate
judicial activity, must also survive scrutiny under the separa-
tion-of-powers doctrine.337 In some senses, both the Appoint-
ments Clause and the inquiry into the "incongruity" of judicial
appointments thereunder can be seen as components of the
Constitution's separation of powers. Above and beyond these
discrete analyses, however, the separation-of-powers doctrine
polices the appropriate relationships and balance of power
among the branches. 338
Although the doctrine may not be explicitly enumerated in
the Constitution's text,339 it is part of "our basic constitutional
337. Generally speaking, there are two schools of jurisprudential thought
on how to approach separation-of-powers issues. The formal approach
"stress[es] that the three branches of government should be kept as distinct as
possible," while the functionalist approach "generally ask[s] whether the exer-
cise of the contested function by one branch impermissibly intrudes into the
core function or domain of [another] branch." Krent, supra note 124, at 1254-
55; see also Todd D. Peterson, Prosecuting Executive Branch Officials for Con-
tempt of Congress, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 563, 583-85 (1991) (comparing formalist
versus functionalist approaches); Strauss, supra note 274, at 488 (contrasting
the Supreme Court's formalist approach in Bowsher v. Synar with its func-
tionalist analysis in Commodity Future Trading Comm'n v. Schor). There is
an argument that a more formal analysis is appropriate when the judicial
branch is assigned responsibilities traditionally assigned to the executive or
legislative branch, in order to protect the judiciary from being forced to make
unnecessary political decisions. See Krotoszynski, supra note 319, at 478.
338. The incongruity analysis and the more general separation-of-powers
analysis are related, yet distinct. The incongruity analysis is introspective, in
that it is specifically concerned with whether the appointing authority in ques-
tion undermines the court's own ability to function properly. The more gen-
eral separation-of-powers analysis focuses on whether the court's exercise of
the appointing authority either inappropriately aggrandizes the power of one
branch or interferes with the proper functioning of another branch.
339. Responding to concerns that the Constitution did not contain an ex-
plicit recognition of the separation of powers, James Madison proposed to add
an article to do just that. Madison proposed to add a new Article VII, which
would have read as follows:
The powers delegated by this constitution, are appropriated to the
departments to which they are respectively distributed: so that the
legislative department shall never exercise the powers vested in the
executive or judicial; nor the executive exercise the powers vested in
436
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doctrine that individual freedoms will best be preserved
through a separation of powers and division of functions among
the different branches and levels of government."340 The Fram-
ers determined that the exercise of certain governmental pow-
ers was too consequential to be granted to any one branch, and
accordingly forced the bfanches to work with one another.341
The Appointments Clause, requiring presidential nomination
and Senate confirmation, is one such safeguard. 342 Neverthe-
less, the Constitution largely confines the legislative, executive,
and judicial actors to their predominant spheres.
The criminal justice system is a perfect illustration of the
separation of powers. Each branch-legislative, executive, and
judicial-has a constitutionally prescribed role. The legislative
branch enacts laws that establish what behavior constitutes a
criminal offense. The President cannot create crimes by execu-
tive order, nor can judges recognize crimes in the absence of a
duly enacted statute. 343 The executive branch, directed by the
the legislative or judicial; nor the judicial exercise the powers vested
in the legislative or executive departments.
12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 202 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rut-
land eds., 1979). Another proposal would have placed a separation-of-powers
amendment in the Bill of Rights. Casper, supra note 27, at 221-22. Ulti-
mately, neither proposal was adopted. Id.
340. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972).
The structure of the Appointments Clause--dividing responsibility for ap-
pointments between the executive and the legislature-can be seen as a struc-
tural blending of the separation of powers. Nonetheless, in order to maintain
the accountability guaranteed by the system, the separation of powers must be
respected and each of the branches must be limited to exercising the authority
granted by the Constitution and not more.
341. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (granting the President a veto
over legislative enactments). The Constitution "does not place comparable in-
ternal checks upon the executive branch." Krent, supra note 124, at 1293.
Professor Krent argues that this lack of restrictions on the executive branch
was based upon the belief that the branch was sufficiently constrained by con-
gressional directive, and that "the need for dispatch in enforcing the laws mili-
tated against any cumbersome requirements delaying executive action." Id.
The Appointments Clause, however, represents a structural blending of pow-
ers-granting Congress the authority to structure the appointments process
for inferior officials and giving Congress a veto over the President's nominees
for principal offices-aimed at instilling inter-branch cooperation and ac-
countability, and ultimately, better government. See id. at 1269 (discussing
the role of the Appointments Clause in "foster[ing] accountability").
342. The goal was to "contriv[e] the interior structure of the government, as
that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means
of keeping each other in their proper places." THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 320
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
343. This country rejected the judicial recognition of common law crimes.
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President, then prosecutes crimes by identifying transgressions
of the law, investigating suspects, indicting defendants, and
presenting evidence of guilt at trial. "The power to decide when
to investigate, and when to prosecute, lies at the core of the
Executive's duty to see to the faithful execution of the laws
... ."344 Neither Congress nor the courts can mandate a crimi-
nal prosecution. Finally, the Constitution provides for a neu-
tral judiciary, institutionally invested in neither the drafting
nor the execution of the law, to hear such cases and controver-
sies as may be brought to its attention.3 45 Neither the legisla-
tive nor the executive branch is entitled to sit in judgment on
the innocence or guilt of individuals.346 Assigning these re-
sponsibilities to different branches and actors was considered
an "essential precaution in favor of liberty."347
By policing the appropriate roles of the branches, the sepa-
ration-of-powers doctrine serves as a "self-executing safeguard
against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at
the expense of the other."348 No branch was considered more
dangerous in this regard than Congress: "ITihe debates of the
Constitutional Convention, and the Federalist Papers, are re-
plete with expressions of fear that the Legislative Branch of the
National Government will aggrandize itself at the expense of
the other two branches."349 It has been suggested that, through
inter-branch appointments, Congress has the capacity to
Only Congress can enact criminal laws. United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 32, 34 (1812).
344. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Pierce, 786 F.2d 1199, 1201 (D.C.
Cir. 1986); see also United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (stat-
ing that the Attorney General and the U.S. Attorneys may decide how to en-
force federal laws "because they are designated by statute as the President's
delegates to help him discharge his constitutional responsibility to 'take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed.'" (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3)).
345. See Amar, supra note 151, at 809 ("Judges should never be in the
business of picking prosecutors-this blurring of adjudicatory and prosecuto-
rial roles ill fits the general liberty-enhancing architecture of separation of
powers.").
346. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 ("No Bill of Attainder ... shall be passed
[by Congress].").
347. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
348. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 381-82 (1989) (quoting Buck-
ley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976) (per curiam)).
349. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 129. See THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 309 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The legislative department is every-
where extending the sphere of its activity and drawing all power into its im-
petuous vortex.").
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"wreak havoc with the system of checks and balances" so that
they "should be permitted only in the narrowest circum-
stances."350 According to Professor Harold Krent, "The balance
of powers among the branches will be altered irrespective of
whether Congress directly adds to its own authority because
Congress's power vis-d-vis the other branch will have increased
in either instance."351
Congress, while not explicitly granting itself any power,
has altered the balance of power in the U.S. Attorney appoint-
ment process through the provisions of § 546. In the absence of
§ 546(d), authority to name the individual to oversee field
prosecutions would inherently revert to the Attorney General
as the head of the Department of Justice. Even if Congress
could limit the ability of the Attorney General or the President
to name unilaterally a successor pending Senate confirma-
tion,352 the authority would, by default, reside in the executive
350. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 27, at 117.
351. Krent, supra note 124, at 1288. There may be two distinct separation-
of-powers inquiries: (1) whether the challenged policy expands (or aggran-
dizes) one branch's power beyond its constitutional confines; and (2) whether
the challenged practice unduly interferes with or undermines another branch's
constitutionally vested authority. Although these may be two sides of the
same coin, they may also represent a more nuanced way of approaching sepa-
ration-of-powers controversies. See Strauss, supra note 274, at 517 (suggest-
ing "an approach that would tend to treat a constitutional actor's 'aggrandize-
ment' of its own function and its 'undermining' or restriction of another's
function as separable issues.").
352. Congress sought to limit the executive branch's unilateral ability to
fill vacancies in offices of the government through the Vacancies Act. 5 U.S.C.
§§ 3345-3349 (1994) (current version at 5 U.S.C. 3345-3349 (2000)) (limiting
appointment of acting officials in several ways including, in most circum-
stances, limiting the tenure of acting officials to 120 days). The Justice De-
partment has historically declared itself unaffected by the Vacancies Act. See
Oversight of the Implementation of the Vacancies Act, Hearing on S.1764 Be-
fore the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 105th Cong. 138-49 (1998)
(statement of Joseph Onek, Principal Deputy Associate Attorney General, De-
partment of Justice) (maintaining that the Vacancies Act does not constrain
acting appointees of the Attorney General); 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 119, 120-
21 (1982). The Department of Justice has argued that the basis for compli-
ance with the Vacancies Act, indeed, compliance with the procedure estab-
lished by the Appointments Clause generally, is "more practical and political
than legal." See id. at 121. Congress sought to change this with the passage
of the Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 which extended the period that acting of-
ficers could serve from 120 to 210 days but unambiguously sought to cover va-
cancies in the Department of Justice. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 3345-3349 (2000).
The Vacancies Act raises interesting questions of separation of pow-
ers, but because of the explicit statutory scheme for filling U.S. Attorney va-
cancies, Vacancy Act issues are beyond the scope of this Article. See id. § 3347
(2000) (excepting from the Vacancies Act those appointments made pursuant
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branch. Congress, by interposing the courts in this political
process, makes it more likely that the President will compro-
mise or accede.
By removing executive-branch authority to name an in-
terim U.S. Attorney and placing that authority in the judiciary,
Congress has changed the playing field dramatically. Under
the process established by the Appointments Clause, if the
Senate is displeased with a presidential nominee, Senators
have to decide whether it is worth expending the necessary po-
litical capital to fight the President through non-
confirmation.353 Of course, the costs are higher if the objections
are meritless or purely political: "The censure of rejecting a
good [nominee] would lie entirely at the door of the Senate, ag-
gravated by the consideration of their having counteracted the
good intentions of the executive." 354 But Congress has found a
way to have its cake and eat it too. In rejecting the President's
nominee or making it known they will do so, which is usually
sufficient, Senators need not worry that they will be blamed for
halting effective law enforcement. The district court will pick
up where the politically accountable branches have left off and
appoint a U.S. Attorney to "assure[ the skillful processing of
cases in which the United States is a party."355 If the Senate
finds that it has more in common with the prosecutorial phi-
to an explicit statutory provision authorizing other means of appointment).
353. In order for this process to function properly, there has to be political
pressure to reach consensus. Professor Gerhardt has opined that consensus in
the appointments context is only likely where (1) both the Senate and the
President believe that each will be held politically accountable for frustrating
or slowing down the process; and (2) the Senate deliberates carefully before
obstructing the President's choices because of "the high odds of failure and the
high costs both to the institution and to individual Senators." Gerhardt, supra
note 108, at 482. According to Professor Gerhardt, due to the structure of the
Appointments Clause,
[It is difficult, if not impossible, for [Senators] to oppose all presiden-
tial nominations and still expect to keep the federal government oper-
ating effectively or to maintain credibility in claiming a purely non-
partisan motivations [sic] for their actions. Consequently, Senators
are forced to pick and choose their confirmation fights with the Presi-
dent carefully.
Gerhardt, supra note 113, at 1366. Although this analysis is most applicable
to the Washington-based officers over whose nomination the Senate has less
influence, it nonetheless informs an appreciation of the structural and institu-
tional dynamics inherent in appointment practices.
354. THE FEDERALIST No. 77, at 461 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Ros-
siter ed., 1961).
355. United States v. Hilario, 218 F.3d 19, 29 (1st Cir. 2000), cert. denied,
121 S. Ct. 572 (2000).
[Vol. 86:363
20011 COURTAPPOINTMENT OF U.S. ATTORNEYS 441
losophy of the district court than with the current President, it
need never confirm a U.S. Attorney. To be sure, such a strat-
egy would reduce the congressional role in selecting a U.S. At-
torney, and presumably, the U.S. Attorney's responsiveness to
congressional inquiry and suggestion. Depending on the politi-
cal climate prevailing at the time, this may not be a bad bar-
gain for the Senators.356 But it is always a bad bargain for the
political accountability sought by the Framers and woven into
the Constitution.
Moreover, as distinguished from the Independent Counsel,
U.S. Attorneys are not intended to operate independent of
presidential control. The Morrison Court deferred to Con-
gress's perceived legitimate interest in shielding the Independ-
ent Counsel from executive-branch control.357 There is no simi-
lar purpose to support removing authority to appoint U.S.
Attorneys from the politically accountable executive branch.
The only explanation for diverting the appointment authority
to the courts is Congress's desire to alter the balance of power
vis-A-vis the executive branch. Vesting authority to appoint
U.S. Attorneys in the district courts is an attempt to raise Con-
gress's profile in the appointments process and to put pressure
on the President to reach consensus with the Senate.358 Courts
should be wary of entering such a politically charged fray.
Court appointment further defeats political accountability
by allowing the President to avoid making tough decisions for
which he or she is constitutionally responsible. The President
may decide that it is expedient to have a court-appointed U.S.
Attorney. For example, the President may wish to avoid dis-
pleasing the Senate or other constituencies through his or her
nominee, and instead of being responsible for poor prosecutorial
decisions, the President may prefer to deflect criticism onto the
356. Professor Richman has offered a similar argument to explain why
Congress has not consolidated authority in Main Justice but has left the U.S.
Attorneys' offices with a great deal of power and discretion: "In a period of di-
vided government, a Congress controlled by one party might well prefer in the
short term that power not be centralized in an executive controlled by the
other party." Richman, supra note 79, at 806.
357. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 677 (1988).
358. Although Professors Lessig and Sunstein argue that "some degree of
independence is constitutionally acceptable" when dealing with the prosecu-
tion of high-level presidential appointees, they concede that "[olther efforts to
insulate prosecution would be more difficult, because the prosecutorial power
is now intermingled with substantive policymaking." Lessig & Sunstein, su-
pra note 27, at 110.
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court. Just as Congress can use the potential for court ap-
pointment as leverage, the President can use the courts' ap-
pointment authority for political cover.3 59 Courts should not
countenance, much less contribute to, executive avoidance of
the constitutional obligation to choose the U.S. Attorney.
Although it is true that the President can remove a court-
appointed U.S. Attorney, he or she cannot stop the court from
naming another (until the President can convince the Senate to
confirm his or her nominee). Nothing prevents a district court
from reappointing a U.S. Attorney who was removed by the
President. It is untenable, however, that a court should be
vested with such authority. Under the Constitution, the Presi-
dent is the head of the executive branch and must be able to be
held accountable for the actions taken by the executive
branch.3 60 In no context is accountability more important to
our civil society than the front lines of law enforcement and the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Under our system of gov-
ernment, accountability resides in the political branches. It
therefore violates the separation-of-powers doctrine to repose
appointment authority for U.S. Attorneys in the judicial
branch.
CONCLUSION
There are many competing priorities in federal law en-
forcement, and no system of appointments or administration
can equally serve all of them. National uniformity and local
control are both important values that naturally oppose one
another. A balance must be struck. Apart from the court ap-
pointment provisions, the current system of administration
strikes a desirable, if inefficient, balance. The President,
359. See, e.g., Rickhoff, supra note 163, at 500 (lamenting that the Western
District of Texas "languished without a presidentially-appointed" U.S. Attor-
ney for more than five years "due simply to political inertia").
360. The Solicitor General has been imbued with a tradition of independ-
ence from executive-branch loyalty that is in some ways greater than that of
the U.S. Attorneys. See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 668 (1997)
(Souter, J., concurring) (discussing the historical independence of the Solicitor
General and suggesting that, at least under Morrison, "the Solicitor General of
the United States ... may well be a principal officer, despite his statutory 'in-
feriority' to the Attorney General"). Yet it would be unacceptable for courts to
appoint an acting Solicitor General in the event of a vacancy, even if the Presi-
dent could remove the appointee at will, because the President must be able to
choose the government's representative to the Supreme Court (and as a
corollary, because the Supreme Court should not choose the government's Su-
preme Court advocate). The same holds true for U.S. Attorneys.
[Vol. 86:363
20011 COURT APPOINTMENT OF U.S. ATTORNEYS
through the Attorney General, is ultimately responsible for fed-
eral law enforcement. But the ninety-three U.S. Attorneys,
through congressional and local influences, maintain an inde-
pendence that makes the reality of federal criminal prosecu-
tions a matter of local discretion. That said, this system of ad-
ministration places too much power in the hands of the U.S.
Attorney to allow for that officer to avoid the scrutiny and ac-
countability ensured through the Appointments Clause2 61
Congress could, if it so desired, create a national criminal
law enforcement administration that would function as a single
hierarchy answerable to the Attorney General. Such a system
could be used to establish uniformity in the exercise of prosecu-
torial discretion--discretion that is currently disbursed and
disparately applied among the U.S. Attorneys. For example,
U.S. Attorneys could be required to submit every decision to
initiate an investigation and every charging decision to the At-
torney General's office for prior review and approval. In other
words, Congress could structure the federal law enforcement
bureaucracy differently so as to make U.S. Attorneys genuinely
inferior officers, appropriately directed and supervised by supe-
rior executive-branch officials. U.S. Attorneys could then, if
361. A determination that the court appointment of U.S. Attorneys is un-
constitutional would not necessarily undermine any of the actions taken (or
convictions secured) by court-appointed U.S. Attorneys: "The de facto officer
doctrine confers validity upon acts performed by a person acting under the
color of official title even though it is later discovered that the legality of that
person's appointment or election to office is deficient." Ryder v. United States,
515 U.S. 177, 180 (1995) (citing Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 440
(1886)); see also McDowell v. United States, 159 U.S. 596, 602 (1895) ("Wlhere
there is an office to be filled and one acting under color of authority fills the
office and discharges its duties, his actions are those of an officer de facto and
binding upon the public."). Courts, however, have become skeptical of invok-
ing the de facto officer doctrine. For example, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, "[flollowing the modern trend," refused to invoke the "ancient
'de facto officer' doctrine" to validate the acts of the court-appointed U.S. At-
torney. United States v. Gantt, 194 F.3d 987, 998-99 (9th Cir. 1999) (reaching
the merits and deciding that the court-appointment process "passes constitu-
tional muster").
Even in the absence of the de facto officer doctrine, however, almost
every action approved by a U.S. Attorney is carried out by a career Assistant
U.S. Attorney, whose commission is not called into question by this analysis.
See id. ("An infirmity in the United States Attorney's appointment would not
generally affect the jurisdiction of th[el court so long as a proper representa-
tive of the government participated in the action."); see also United States v.
Hilario, 218 F.3d 19, 22 (1st Cir. 2000) (noting that "[blecause they are ap-
pointed directly by the Attorney General, [Assistant U.S. Attorneys'] ability to
act does not hinge on the authority of the local United States Attorney" (cita-
tion omitted)), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 572 (2000).
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Congress so chose, be selected from the corps of professional,
civil service prosecutors at Main Justice and in the ninety-four
U.S. Attorneys' offices through a merit-based promotion sys-
tem. Alternatively, the Attorney General could be vested with
the sole authority to appoint-and to remove-U.S. Attorneys.
Under a system of direct supervision and effective control, the
U.S. Attorneys properly could be considered inferior officers
under the Appointments Clause, and as a consequence, Con-
gress would have more discretion in structuring their appoint-
ments pursuant to the Excepting Clause. Taken to its logical
conclusion, the reasoning of the Hilario and Gantt cases, for
example, would even permit Congress to remove the selection
of U.S. Attorneys from the executive branch altogether and vest
the appointment of U.S. Attorneys exclusively in the courts.
Congress is unlikely to endorse such a dramatic change in
the character of federal law enforcement for several interre-
lated reasons. As it stands, Senators exercise significant influ-
ence over the selection of U.S. Attorneys. The system provides
Congress with a strong hand in ensuring that the federal law
enforcement official most affecting their constituents is locally
attuned and responsive. It also allows Senators to remain cen-
tered in local politics; the U.S. Attorney selection has implica-
tions both for individual Senators' legacies and the direction of
their political parties. Moreover, by remaking U.S. Attorneys
into inferior officers, Congress could not expand its role in se-
lecting U.S. Attorneys. It could only maintain the Senate's cur-
rent role or remove itself altogether from the appointment
process by vesting exclusive appointive authority in the Presi-
dent, the head of a department, or the courts of law. There
would seem to be little incentive for Congress to initiate such a
change.
This argument brings this Article back to examining the
current system and suggesting somewhat more modest modifi-
cations. If Congress wants to maintain the independence of the
U.S. Attorneys, then U.S. Attorneys must be nominated by the
President and confirmed by the Senate. The Appointments
Clause brooks no exception to this rule if, as this Article ar-
gues, U.S. Attorneys constitute principal officers. But Congress
has, for all intents and purposes, granted itself a second option
to govern those times when the President has not nominated
someone whom the Senate is willing to confirm. In times of
appointment gridlock, neither the Senate nor the President
need suffer for their obstinacy. The courts, Congress has de-
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termined, should appoint the U.S. Attorney when the political
branches are unable to reach consensus. The Constitution,
however, designed a different system, one in which the politi-
cally accountable branches have an interest in holding the oth-
ers' feet to the fire. The Appointments Clause requires that the
legislative and the executive branches work with one another.
They cannot decide that on occasion this requisite cooperation
is too onerous or inconvenient. They cannot abdicate their re-
sponsibilities and select the judiciary to fill the ensuing void.
Yet this is precisely what the current system allows them to do.
This Article does not advocate overhauling the Department
of Justice and making U.S. Attorneys truly inferior officers.
The present system generally works well at serving many var-
ied interests. It honors our tradition of federalism with na-
tional policies tempered by local discretion. The system is not
perfect, however, and the partisan political instincts of U.S. At-
torneys need to be kept in check. The way to instill that check
is for the President and Congress to fulfill their constitutionally
prescribed roles.
If U.S. Attorneys are classified as inferior officers, then the
Senate's advice and consent is not constitutionally required.
Nonetheless, the procedures utilized for appointing U.S. Attor-
neys should be modified. Consistent with the appropriate in-
dependence of the judiciary and the separation of powers,
courts should not perform the political function of selecting su-
pervisory prosecutors. The appointment of prosecutors is in-
herently political, requiring the weighing of policy priorities
and personal qualities such as management skills and leader-
ship abilities. Even if judges could be considered qualified to
undertake such responsibilities, such appointments threaten
their institutional independence, impartiality, and ultimately,
the courts' integrity. The court-appointment provisions of 28
U.S.C. § 546 should be recognized as incongruous with appro-
priate judicial activity. Moreover, it is a function more natu-
rally exercised by the executive-branch department to which
U.S. Attorneys belong. As law enforcement is an executive
function, the authority to direct the work of a U.S. Attorney's
office-either through the appointment of an acting U.S. Attor-
ney or through other means-should reside within the execu-
tive branch.
This is not to say that Congress is without means to affect
the selection of the interim U.S. Attorney or to force the execu-
tive branch to name a successor in a timely fashion. Congress
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has the ability to ensure that only responsible, professional
prosecutors discharge the responsibilities of the U.S. Attorney
during a vacancy. For example, Congress might require that
acting U.S. Attorneys be selected from among the career prose-
cutors in the local U.S. Attorney's office. In the alternative,
Congress could require Senate-confirmed officials from Main
Justice to administer a U.S. Attorney's office directly where
there is a vacancy. Limiting the executive-branch's discretion
in this way would also provide a powerful incentive for the
President to nominate an acceptable candidate for the perma-
nent position. If a previously confirmed Department of Justice
official had to be redirected to administer a U.S. Attorney's of-
fice, one can be confident that vacancies would be short-lived.
Congress also could play budgetary hardball with an admini-
stration that was lagging on U.S. Attorney nominations or try-
ing to skirt the Appointments Clause by functioning with in-
terim or acting U.S. Attorneys. Intense congressional oversight
is another avenue for securing executive-branch cooperation.
Enlisting the judiciary in this fight, however, is neither neces-
sary nor appropriate.
U.S. Attorneys and district court judges very often must
work on the same cases: U.S. Attorneys as representatives of
the executive branch as it seeks to enforce the laws, and judges
as representatives of the independent judiciary. Having courts
appoint U.S. Attorneys undermines the institutional integrity
of both groups. Such a process comports with neither the Con-
stitution nor the proper role of judges. Furthermore, such a
process is not necessary. The appointment of U.S. Attorneys
ought to be left to the executive branch, with the advice and
consent of the Senate and with the supervision and oversight
that Congress deems necessary. In this way, each branch can
perform its proper role in the detection and punishment of
crime-duties that are vital to our general welfare and domes-
tic tranquility.
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